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Riassunto 
 
Una delle domande di ricerca più affascinanti all’interno delle scienze cognitive dello 
sviluppo riguarda il comprendere a quali cambiamenti la cognizione vada incontro nel 
corso dello sviluppo per raggiungere il livello di specializzazione osservato nell’adulto. 
A tal fine, una delle più grandi sfide è quella di determinare quali siano le abilità che i 
neonati posseggono fin dalla nascita e come le predisposizioni innate fungano da 
innesco nel processo di specializzazione del sistema nel corso dello sviluppo e in 
funzione dell’esperienza. In particolare l’obiettivo di questo lavoro è quello di studiare 
come il sistema si specializzi per riconoscere degli agenti sociali considerando il fatto 
che gli esseri umani sono creature sociali in grado di comprendere le intenzioni e le 
emozioni altrui basandosi sulla analisi di segnali non verbali e che nell’adulto è presente 
una specializzazione neurale e funzionale per l’elaborazione di stimoli sociali (Adolphs, 
2009). Riconoscere gli agenti sociali implica la messa in atto di una serie di processi, 
quali orientare l’attenzione verso di essi, saperli discriminare rispetto ad altri stimoli, 
quali ad esempio gli oggetti inanimati, e poterli categorizzare come agenti sociali, che si 
affinano man mano nel corso dello sviluppo. Sicuramente, in ottica evolutiva, l’abilità 
di poter utilizzare il movimento come indice per poter riconoscere e categorizzare un 
agente come sociale potrebbe essere un precursore fondamentale di abilità cognitive più 
sofisticate, quali anticipare l’obiettivo delle azioni altrui e di conseguenza adeguare il 
proprio comportamento (Gallese, Rochat, Cossu, & Sinigaglia, 2009). Non ci sono 
dubbi infatti, che prima di attribuire obiettivi e intenzioni agli altri, gli esseri umani 
individuino gli altri esseri sociali nell’ambiente e che, per poter fare questo, abbiano 
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bisogno di usare indici percettivi che consentano loro di discriminare tra esseri animati 
ed inanimati.  
Considerando il movimento come un aspetto fondamentale che gli esseri umani 
possono utilizzare per distinguere gli essere animati dagli inanimati e riferendomi al 
modello teorico del Neo/Neuro-Costruttivismo, l’obiettivo della mia tesi di dottorato è 
quello di testare il ruolo svolto dagli indici di movimento nella identificazione degli 
esseri sociali e delle loro azioni.  
In particolare, la mia ipotesi è che il nostro sistema visivo abbia fin dalla nascita dei 
biases attentivi per dei specifici indici di movimento che caratterizzano il movimento 
degli esseri animati. Questi biases sarebbero i punti di partenza da cui origina il cervello 
sociale che a partire dalla identificazione degli esseri viventi arriverà “a leggere” non 
solo gli obiettivi delle azioni ma anche le intenzioni e gli stati mentali degli altri esseri 
sociali.  L’esperienza avrebbe dunque un ruolo centrale nello strutturare il sistema e nel 
farlo diventare specializzato ad elaborare le informazioni sociali.  
 In quest’ottica, nel primo capitolo di carattere teorico, verrà introdotto 
l’approccio Neo/Neuro-costruttivista e verrà descritto come il cervello sociale e la 
cognizione sociale si sviluppano nella specie umana.  
Nella seconda parte della tesi (Capitolo 2). saranno presentati una serie di 
esperimenti il cui obiettivo sarà quello di testare l’ipotesi che fin dalla nascita il sistema 
abbia dei biases attentivi verso gli indici cinematici che caratterizzano il movimento 
degli esseri animati.  Impiegando paradigmi quali la preferenza visiva e l’abituazione, è 
stato investigato a quali indici di movimento, che nell’adulto elicitano la percezione di 
un oggetto come animato, il sistema visivo fosse sensibile fin dalla nascita. Nello 
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specifico i neonati hanno mostrato di preferire il movimento auto-generato rispetto ad 
un inizio di movimento ambiguo (Esperimento 1 e 2).  
 I risultati degli Esperimenti 3, 4, 5 e 6 dimostrano, come fin dalla nascita il 
sistema umano possieda un bias attentivo per un oggetto che cambia velocità con una 
sequenza caratterizzata da accelerazione-decelerazione rispetto ad un oggetto che si 
muove a velocità costante, ma solamente quando i cambi di velocità in accelerazione e 
decelerazione sono presentati insieme e nell’ordine in cui l’accelerazione preceda la 
decelerazione.  
 Questi risultati confermano la presenza di bias attentivi per gli indici di 
movimento che caratterizzano gli esseri animati. Quest’iniziale predisposizione 
permetterebbe al sistema di focalizzare l’attenzione verso indici di movimento quali, il 
movimento auto-generato e cinematiche caratterizzate da cambi di velocità in termini di 
accelerazione e decelerazione, anche quando questi indici sono presenti in 
configurazioni complesse di punti come dimostrano le ricerche che attestano una 
preferenza per il movimento biologico alla nascita (Simion, Regolin, & Bulf, 2008; 
Bardi, Regolin, & Simion 2011). Studi condotti con adulti hanno inoltre dimostrato che 
da queste configurazioni di punti è possibile estrarre una serie di informazioni 
socialmente rilevanti come ad esempio il genere e lo stato emotivo (Kozlowski & 
Cutting, 1977; Dittrich, Troscianko, Lea & Morgan 1996) e che la direzione della 
camminata determina un orientamento dell’attenzione verso la direzione dello spazio da 
essa indicata (Bardi, Di Giorgio, Lunghi, Troje & Simion, 2015). In quest’ottica, 
l’obiettivo degli esperimenti descritti nel Capitolo 3, è stato quello di testare se la 
direzione della camminata umana veicolata da un insieme complesso di punti possa 
elicitare un orientamento attentivo anche nei bambini di pochi mesi di vita. A tal fine è 
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stato utilizzato il paradigma di cueing (Posner, 1980) e sono state registrate le risposte 
evento relate alla comparsa di uno stimolo periferico (ERPs; HD Geodesic System). I 
risultati degli Esperimenti 7 e 8 dimostrano che l’abilità di poter utilizzare la direzione 
della camminata come indice per orientare l’attenzione compare a partire dai 6 mesi di 
vita.  
 I dati elettroencefalografici dimostrano che sia nei bambini di 6 mesi di vita che 
in partecipanti adulti, l’orientamento attentivo veicolato dalla direzione della camminata 
umana produce un effetto sulle componenti sensoriali quando uno stimolo periferico 
compare nella posizione spaziale indicata dalla direzione della camminata umana 
(Esperimenti 8 e 9). La modulazione delle componenti sensoriali sembra suggerire che 
la direzione della camminata umana eliciti un orientamento attentivo e di conseguenza 
produca un “beneficio” in termini di miglior elaborazione delle informazioni che 
compaiono in posizioni congruenti alla direzione della camminata.  
Complessivamente, i dati presentati in questa tesi estendono le precedenti 
conoscenze che dimostravano che la detezione degli agenti sociali si basa sulla presenza 
della configurazione volto (Valenza, Simion, Macchi Cassia & Umiltà, 1996) e 
mostrano che essa avviene anche sulla base di indici di movimento a cui il nostro 
sistema visivo è sensibile fin dalla nascita. Questo avvalora l’ipotesi che la presenza di 
biases attentivi verso alcuni peculiari indici cinematici focalizzi l’attenzione su queste 
informazioni rilevanti e filtri l’esperienza che il sistema umano acquisisce per la 
costruzione del cervello sociale. In quest’ottica i biases attentivi e l’esperienza sono il 
punto di partenza su cui il sistema si specializza nel riconoscimento degli agenti sociali 
e su cui poi la specie umana costruisce la cognizione sociale. Queste conclusioni sono in 
linea con l’approccio Neo/Neuro-costruttivista e suggeriscono che l’esperienza con i 
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conspecifici svolga un ruolo rilevante durante lo sviluppo per strutturare la conoscenza 
e determinare la specializzazione del sistema.  
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Abstract 
 
A central issue in developmental cognitive science is to understand how 
cognition develops and changes over time to reach an adult level of specialization. 
Determining the abilities with which infants come equipped into the world, their 
mechanisms for acquiring knowledge, and whether and how these abilities change as a 
function of development and experience is a challenging issue. 
Since humans are intensely social creatures and they tend to rely on visual 
signals for communicating psychological dispositions, intentions and emotions, the 
study of how our system becomes specialized to detect and recognize others is an 
interesting field of research. A fundamental human social ability is the capacity to 
accurately detect and understand the intentional conduct of others, to anticipate their 
upcoming actions, and to appropriately adjust their own behavior (Gallese, Rochat, 
Cossu, & Sinigaglia, 2009). Particularly, face and body motion represent primary social 
cues and it has been demonstrated that adults’ brain has a specific neural network that 
supports detection and recognition of conspecifics and their actions (Adolphs, 2009). 
From an ontogenetic perspective, the ability to read behavioral cues may be 
regarded as the fundamental precursors of more sophisticated social cognitive abilities 
(Gallese et al., 2009). Indeed, there is no doubt that before attributing goals, desires, 
dispositions to social agents, humans need to detect them in the environment and they 
need to use perceptual cues that allow them to discriminate animate versus inanimate 
objects. One of the most powerful cues that attract attention since birth is motion. 
Moreover, motion of living being has specific features that are not shared with motion 
of inanimate objects.  
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Considering motion as a fundamental feature that human species might use to 
detect others and within the Neo/Neuro-constructivist theoretical framework, the 
purpose of my PhD dissertation is to test the role of kinematic cues in detection of 
social agents.  
Particularly, my hypothesis is that our visual system, since birth, possesses some 
attentional biases towards specific cues of motion that characterize animate entities. 
These low-level biases are the building blocks, on which during development, infants 
built their ability to infer other intentions. In this vein, the experience during the first 
months of life, plays a central role in shaping how our species can use kinematics 
information, and also in shaping the system to become specialized in processing social 
information.  
With this consideration in mind, my thesis begins with a theoretical chapter 
describing the Neo/Neuro-constructivist approach and how it explains the origin of 
social brain and social cognition in humans.  
Subsequently, in the second part of the thesis I will describe a series of 
experiments aimed at testing the hypothesis of the presence of low-level attentional 
biases towards cues of motion that characterize human motion since birth (Chapter 2).  
Using both the visual preference and the visual habituation techniques, the aim 
of the experiments presented in Chapter 2 was to investigate to which motion cues that 
in adults elicit animacy perception, the human visual system is sensitive since birth. On 
the basis of previous evidence showing that human infants, adults and even newly 
hatched chicks seem to use dynamic cues such as self-propulsion, change in direction, 
(Mascalzoni, Regolin & Vallortigara, 2010) and speed changes to discriminate between 
animate and inanimate entities (Tremoulet & Feldman, 2000; Lou & Baillargeron 2005) 
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human newborns without any previous experience have been tested, (Experiment 1; 
Experiment 2).  Collected data demonstrate that at birth also human newborns are 
sensitive to these cues. 
Furthermore, results from Experiment 3, 4, 5, and 6, demonstrate that newborns 
possess an innate predisposition towards a specific acceleration-deceleration pattern of 
kinematic (Experiment 5), and they do not manifest any preference towards a single 
speed change (Experiment 3, and 4) or when the order of presentation of acceleration-
deceleration is inverted (Experiment 6).  
These results have been interpreted as suggesting that newborns possess some 
attentional biases towards cues of motion that characterize animate entities.  This inborn 
sensitivity towards self-propulsion and acceleration-deceleration pattern of motion 
allows the system to focus attention towards these specific cues of motion also when 
they are embedded in complex arrays.  
Previous evidence demonstrates that newborns and infants manifest a sensitivity 
toward these motion cues also when they are embedded in a complex array of dots (i.e. 
Simion, Regolin & Bulf, 2008; Bardi, Regolin & Simion, 2011). Moreover, evidence 
collected with adults demonstrates that when the complex array of dots depicts a 
walking human figure, adults can retrieve multiple information form it such as walking 
direction (Bardi, Di Giorgio, Lunghi, Troje & Simion 2015). In light of this, the aim of 
the experiments described in Chapter 3, was to test whether the information of 
directionality conveyed by a complex array of dots can trigger orienting of attention in 
infancy. Specifically, a cueing paradigm was employed (Posner, 1980) and target 
locked event related responses (ERPs; HD Geodesic System) were recorded. Data from 
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Experiments 7, and 8 demonstrated that the ability to use walking direction to orient 
attention towards the peripheral space is an ability that emerges from 6 months of age.  
Moreover, ERPs results indicate that 6-month-old infants, as well as adults, 
show a modulation of sensory components when a peripheral target appeared in a 
congruent position with walking direction (Experiment 8 and 9) demonstrating that 
walking direction can yield a gain control or selective amplification of the sensory 
information in the extra-cortical visual pathways. 
Overall, these data demonstrate that detection of social agents relies upon 
motion cues and that our visual system is tuned, since birth, to specific cues of motion 
that define human kinematics. It is hypothesized that these cues of motion might be the 
building blocks on which our species infer and extract intentions of others (Biro & 
Leslie 2007; Carey, 2009) and that the experience with conspecific might shape our 
ability to use motion cues to orient attention toward the surrounding space. These 
conclusions are in line with the Neo/Neuro-Constructivist theory of cognitive 
development and suggest that experience with conspecifics play a fundamental role in 
shaping the human system that become specialized in detecting social agents.  
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Chapter 1 
The origin of social brain in humans:  
The Neo/Neuro-Constructivist approach 
 
Introduction 
 A central question for developmental psychologists concerns the origin of 
knowledge in different domains. One of the peculiar characteristic of human beings is 
that they constantly interact with others and they are able to process stimuli in social 
context (Adolphs, 1999). A fundamental ability, that is at the bases of social cognition, 
is the capacity to accurately detect and understand the intentional conduct of others, to 
anticipate their upcoming actions, and to contingently adjust one’s own behavior to 
other actions (Gallese et al., 2009). In adults, these social abilities seem to be supported 
by a neural network namely Social Brain. There is no doubt that before attributing 
goals, desires, dispositions to social agents, humans need to detect others in the 
environment, and they need to use and to extract perceptual cues that allow them to 
discriminate animate versus inanimate entities.  
 The following chapter will be devoted to present an overview of the major 
theoretical positions (i.e. Domain-general, domain-specific and Neo/Neuro-
constructivist approaches) that describe the development of knowledge in humans. 
Subsequently, the Social Brain network in adults of human species will be presented 
and how the different theoretical viewpoints tried to describe the origin and the 
ontogenetic development of it. Specifically, it will be distinguished between theories 
that posit that mechanisms that humans inherited from their evolutionary history are 
 16 
general form those theories that state that these mechanisms are specific, and how visual 
experience shapes the progressive specialization to process social stimuli.  
 
1.1 The two classical theoretical points of view of knowledge and cognitive 
development 
Since the Ancient Greece, intellectuals and philosophers wonder about the 
developmental origins of the human knowledge.  The different domains of knowledge 
can be defined as body of knowledge about a given topic that includes information 
about what entities are included in the domain as well as rules that describe how the 
entities in the domain behave (Rutherford, 2013). A classical debate that dominates 
developmental sciences, concerns the role of domain-general versus domain-specific 
mechanisms on human knowledge. Classical theories in developmental psychology 
might be divided on the two extremes of this debate.  
 Domain-general theories support the idea that knowledge emerges on the basis 
of domain-general mechanisms of learning (i.e. error driven) that are sufficient to 
explain how children and infants learn about specific domain of knowledge such as, for 
example, language, number, and space.  
On the contrary, according to domain-specific theories, knowledge constitutes 
part of the human innate endowment. In this vein, the human mind is endowed with a 
set of special purpose mechanisms shaped, through adaption, to the environment during 
evolution, to perform specific functions. Nativism is at the bases of the domain-specific 
theories of development. Domain-specific theories maintain that human knowledge is 
built on domain-specific systems and that natural selection had favored the evolution of 
mechanisms that leads to this knowledge (Kellman, 1993). According to some authors, 
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neonates and infants come into the world with domain-specific principles allowing them 
to process specific types of inputs (Spelke, 1990; Baillargeon & Wang, 2002), in 
different domains of knowledge such as number and faces (Spelke & Kinzler, 2007). In 
this vein, learning is guided by innately specified and domain-specific principles that 
determine the entities on which subsequent learning takes place (Gelman, 1990; Spelke, 
1991). 
The nativistic aspect of domain-specific viewpoint of development, was also influenced 
by Fodor’s Modularity of Mind theory (1983). According to Fodor, humans are born 
with the innate capacity to develop information processing systems or “cognitive 
modules” that allow them to make sense of the world. Cognitive modules, as defined by 
Fodor (1983), are hardwired (not assembled from more primitive processes) of fixed 
neural architecture, domain specific, fast, autonomous, mandatory (higher level 
cognitive processes cannot curtail their operation), and stimulus driven.  
A third perspective of development, that overcomes the classical debate between 
domain general and domain specific theories is Neo/Neuro-constructivist theory. 
 
1.2 Neo/Neuro Constructivism  
The Neo-Constructivist approach, as stated in the name, starts from Piagetian 
Constructivist theory. Piaget’s position, well known as Epigenetic Constructivism, 
maintains that cognitive development is the product of a self-organizing system that is 
structured and shaped by its interaction with the environment. According to Piaget, the 
mind of newborns is knowledge free; but it is furnished of domain-general mechanisms 
(i.e. accommodation, assimilation and equilibration) that are the mechanisms that child 
use to build knowledge. These mechanisms, well known as functional invariants, 
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through the interaction with the external world which is favorite along with innate 
reflexes (i.e. sucking, grasping) are the bases of knowledge. The most important thing in 
Piaget’s theory is that babies have an active role in the construction of knowledge. They 
act and interact with the external world, since birth along with innate reflexes and thank 
to the interaction between the external world and the functional invariants they build the 
cognitive structures of their mind.  
Neo-Constructivism (literally, New Constructivism), combines the two different 
aspects postulated by nativism and epigenetic principles and assumes the existence of 
some innate specified predispositions that would trigger the epigenetic process in each 
domain of knowledge (Simion & Leo, 2010). In this sense, the dichotomy between 
domain-specific and domain-general mechanisms is overcome. Within this theoretical 
framework, the development is seen as a continuous process that emerges through the 
dynamic of a probabilistic epigenesis and that progressively leads to an increasing 
functional specialization of neural circuits (Bates & Elman, 1993; Johnson, 2011; 
Karmiloff-Smith, 1992). “Probabilistic epigenesis (Gottlieb, 1992), considers that the 
development involves the progressive restriction of fate. Early in development, a system, 
such as the brain/mind, has a range of possible developmental paths and end states. The 
developmental path and end state that result, are dependent on the particular sets of 
constraints that operate during the development” (Johnson, 2011 p. 12; Waddington, 
1975; Gottlieb, 1992).   
According to Neo-constructivist approach, cognitive activity is seen as emerging 
gradually as a product of the interaction between innate constraints and the structure of 
the input provided by the environment (de Schonen, 2002; Johnson, 1993; Nelson & 
Luciana, 2001). In this scenario, specific cognitive structures observed in adults may 
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arise from primary, general innate constraints shaped by the nature of the experience the 
organism is exposed in a given period of time (Karmiloff-Smith, 1992). Constraints are 
not considered in a negative way, but they are defined as bases of information 
processing due to the properties of the brain or the perceptual system. This 
conceptualization of constraints differs from the innate domain specific modules as 
defined by Fodor (1983), but they are present since birth and help the cognitive system 
to organize the information that comes from the external world. These constraints, 
conceptualized as attentional biases, allow the system to have benefits such as focusing 
the cognitive system toward certain aspects of the environment or facilitating processing 
of certain types of inputs. The information recovered thank to these biases progressively 
tune the system to become specialized. Another important aspect conceptualized by 
Neo-constructivism is that, during development, there are crucial time windows such as 
critical and/or sensitive periods (Greenough, Black, & Wallace, 1987; Greenough & 
Black, 1992) during which the role of experience affects profoundly cognitive 
development. Critical period refers to the existence of time window strictly delimited 
during which a specific experience could have effect on the development. In contrast, 
sensitive periods are defined as those moments in which the organism is particularly 
sensitive to specific experiences, with no need to exclude that these experiences could 
continue to have influence also in successive time windows during the ontogenetic 
development (Macchi Cassia, Valenza & Simion, 2012). 
To summarize, the Neo-constructivist approach overcomes the dichotomy of 
classical theories of development, and suggests that the specific outcome in cognitive 
development is the product of a process of modularization. The specificity of certain 
brain areas or cognitive processes is not pre-determined since birth, but rather emerges 
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gradually during development. The natural selection and the evolution have pre-
specified many innate general biases (constraints) and through them the babies 
experienced actively the world where they are embedded. These biases, general at the 
beginning, become selectively specialized as a function of the experience with the 
external world. In light of this, it is plausible to speak of a process of modularization 
since the modular architecture of the brain arises from a gradual development rather 
than to be modular from the origin.  
The neuropsychological counterpart of Neo-Constructivism is the Neuro-
Constructivism, which emphasizes the interrelation between brain development and 
cognitive development (Karmiloff-Smith, 1992; Quartz & Sejnowski, 1997; Sirois, 
Spratling, Thomas, Westermann, Mareschal, & Johnson, 2008). For the Neuro-
constructivist approach, development is a progressive increase of the complexity of 
representations and development of new abilities based on earlier and simpler ones. The 
increasing of complexity of representations is the outcome of a progressive 
specialization of cortical structures. The step forward that Neuro-constructivism offers 
is that cognitive development is strictly related to the development of the underlying 
cortical structures in the brain. In this vein, constraints operate on development of 
neural structures that are at the bases of mental representations, and cognitive 
development is considered as a trajectory emerging from the interplay of these 
constrains. As mentioned before, also brain development is seen as derived from the 
progressive restriction of the fate of neurons and neural circuits. In other words, as 
development proceeds, neurons and cortical circuits become increasingly specialized, 
dedicated to particular functions and less capable of change. Also in this vein, the 
development of neural circuits is seen as a product of the interaction between internal 
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constraints (anatomical and architectural constraints) and constraints that come from 
environment. Endogenous constraints select the aspect of the environment to which 
orienting attention and, interacting, with the neural structure of the input typical of the 
infants’ environment, guide and shape the gradual emerging of specialized processing 
(Werker & Vouloumanos, 2001). 
From a functional point of view, both Neo-Constructivism and Neuro-
Constructivism, embraced the interactive specialization perspective suggesting that the 
development is the outcome of a constant interaction between environment and genes. 
These two aspects mutually interact each other and the development of brain structures 
is defined as experience expectant. Structures may initially have homogeneous response 
towards different types of inputs such as faces, and actions (Grossman & Johnson, 
2007). With the experience, the neural circuits may become more differentiated and 
specialized in their responses, finally resulting highly specialized as in the adults’ brain.  
 To conclude, Neo- and Neuro-constructivism, postulated development as a 
continuous process, starting from general predispositions that might be present since 
birth, and thank to the constant interaction with the experience that came from the 
environment the system will become specialized. In addition, it might be possible to 
design developmental trajectories for specified cognitive functions and for processing 
specific classes of stimuli.  
According to this theoretical framework, and considering that humans are 
intensely social creatures, many researchers investigated the origins and the 
developmental time course trajectory of the “social brain”. 
 
1.3 The Social Brain 
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 Humans are intensely social creatures. One of the most peculiar and unique 
characteristic of the human brain is the ability to process stimuli in a social context 
(Adolphs, 1999; Brothers, 1996). To perceive, detect, and discriminate humans from 
objects is critical for adaptive behavior considering that at the first stages of life, our 
survival is strictly dependent from caregivers and as a consequence to the infants’ 
ability to detect them. Adults, are extremely proficient in all the cognitive processes that 
are at the bases of social cognition since our social interaction is strictly dependent on 
our abilities to understand the intentions of the conduct of others, to anticipate their 
upcoming actions, and to contingently adjust one’s own behavior to other actions 
(Gallese et al., 2009). Certainly, a critical aspect of social cognition is social perception, 
that is the initial stage of evaluating intentions of others by the analysis of the 
behavioral cues such as body motion, hand gestures and facial expressions.  
In adults, all these processes seem to be supported by a specific neural network, 
known as Social Brain (Adolphs, 2009). In accordance with the Social Brain 
Hypothesis, that states that social creatures are endowed with this specific network 
devoted to detecting, recognizing and perceiving social stimuli, several neuroimaging 
studies have tried to define which are the brain areas involved. Findings suggest that 
certain subcortical and cortical areas of the brain, such as the amygdala, the 
orbitofrontal cortex and the temporal poles are specialized for processing information 
that are peculiar of social agents, such as identity, behavior, and intentions (Brothers, 
2002). More recent neuroimaging studies, extend the social brain network to other 
regions: the superior temporal sulcus (STS), the orbitofrontal cortex, and the fusiform 
face area (Allison, Puce, & McCarthy, 2000; Farah, Rabinowitz, Quinn, & Liu, 2000; 
Kanwisher, 2000;). It has been demonstrated that superior temporal sulcus is involved 
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in processing a variety of social information. STS is activated when adults perceive 
human motion rather than other types of motion, such as random motion (Bonda, 
Petrides, Ostry & Evans, 1996; Grossman et al., 2000; Grossman & Blake, 2001), eye 
gaze shifts and mouth movements (i.e. Puce, Allison, Bentin, Gore & McCarthy, 1998), 
hands and other body parts actions (Rizzolatti et al., 1996; Pelphrey, Morris, Michelich, 
Allison & McCarthy, 2005). STS seems to be a key node of the social brain network in 
adults. Nevertheless, STS did not operate isolate but is strictly connected with others 
cortical and subcortical regions involved in Social Brain circuitry.  
One of the most important debate in cognitive neuroscience is about the origins 
of the “social brain” in humans 
 
1.4 The origin of Social Brain 
From a phylogenetic viewpoint, it has been demonstrated that also many other 
vertebrates (i.e. chicks, and monkeys) orient their attention toward social agents. 
Specifically, newly hatched chicks detect others on the basis of the way they move 
(Regolin, Tommasi & Vallortigara, 2000). Similarly, monkeys manifest a preference for 
faces rather than objects (Sugita, 2008). This evidence seems to support the idea of the 
existence of hard wired mechanism to detect social stimuli. This mechanism might be 
present, since birth, in animals as well in humans (Johnson, 2007).   
From an ontogenetic point of view, researchers tried to explain the origin of the 
social brain according three different perspectives of functional development of 
cognition (i.e. maturational, skill learning, interactive specialization; Johnson 2001; 
2005).  
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According to the maturational perspective, the evolution has been selected 
specific parts of the brains that become dedicated to process social information. Some 
of these areas are present and active since birth, whereas other parts will become 
functioning later during development according to specified maturational timetable. The 
experience has no role in affecting the timetable of maturational process. On the 
contrary, the skill learning hypothesis postulates that social stimuli are not different 
from other type of inputs. Brain areas deputed to process social information are not 
specialized because of the social nature of the stimuli (i.e. domain specificity), but 
because the constant experience with social stimuli shaped the brain areas (process 
specificity). It is hypothesized that the regions active in infants during the onset of new 
perceptual or behavioral abilities are the same as those involved in skill acquisition in 
adults (Johnson, Grossman, & Farroni, 2008). 
According to Neo- and Neuro-Constructivism and the interactive specialization 
perspective, the social brain would develop as an outcome of the interaction between 
initial biases and the experience with the environment. From this viewpoint, the neural 
circuits of the social brain are the product of the organization of cerebral cortex areas 
that are initially broadly tuned and become progressively more specialized (Johnson, 
2001). Starting from the constructivist theory, the interaction with the environment 
generates structural changes in brain areas that co-develop with functional changes in 
cognitive processes (Johnson, 2000), and the timing of events plays a critical role in 
developmental trajectories. 
In other words, the specialization of the cognitive system cannot be ascribed to 
pre-specified regions, but to a particular sequence of interactions between cortical 
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circuits and the pre- and post-natal environment, resulting in successive reorganizations 
of the cortical circuits themselves. (de Schonen, 2002).  
In this vein, social brain arises from a constant interaction between cortical 
circuits and experience. For example, at birth brain cortex is not fully developed but 
subcortical structures are functioning. Studies with newborns demonstrated that superior 
colliculus is completely functioning (Simion, Valenza, Umiltà, Dalla Barba, 1995) and 
might support orienting of attention since birth so that to explain newborns’ capability 
to process potentially relevant information in the surrounding space. It has been 
hypothesized that subcortical structures continuously send inputs to cortical region and 
together with the experience and the interaction with co-specifics, may contribute to the 
specialization of cortical brain areas involved in the social brain network.  
In line with the interactive specialization hypothesis, the present thesis will 
examine the emergence of the specialized cognitive system devoted to processing 
kinematics of social agents and the role of perceptual biases and experience in 
contributing to the development of the social brain. 
 
1.5 Detecting agents based on motion cues 
 As aforementioned, at the basis of social cognition, there is the capacity to 
accurately detect and understand the intentional conduct of others (Gallese et al., 2009). 
Moreover, there is also no doubt that before attributing goals, desires, dispositions to 
social agents, humans need to discriminate animate versus inanimate entities. It has 
been demonstrated that social stimuli such as faces, play a central role in detection and 
recognition of others. Another cue that allow animal species to differentiate animate 
from inanimate objects is “the way they move”. Indeed, a feature that is constantly 
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present during social interaction is motion. With the term motion, we usually can refer 
to body motion, face expressions and hand gestures. Certainly, kinematics of humans, 
as well as of other vertebrates, is peculiar and characterized by specific cues of motion, 
such as self-propulsion and patterns of acceleration and deceleration. For example, 
when vertebrate walks, the pattern of motion of each single step has an accelerated-
decelerated sequence. The acceleration phase preceded the deceleration at the beginning 
of each step (e.g. when the foot starts moving) and deceleration is at the end of the 
action, when the body parts are approaching a surface. 
 In light of this, as well with other social stimuli, it might be plausible to 
hypothesize that social perception might be built on perceptual cues that characterize 
living entities.  
In this vein, the present thesis will examine and try to design a developmental 
trajectory for the detection of social agents based on kinematic cues that characterize 
animate entities and the biological motion of the legged vertebrates.  
According to Moore (2012) as described in Chapter 3, a terminological 
clarification is necessary among the three terms of “animate motion”, “biomechanical 
motion” and “human motion”. Traditionally these terms have been used to refer to 
different topics. However, considering the kinematics proprieties of motion of living 
being the three terms can be considered as different levels of a unique taxonomy based 
on motion features (see figure 1.1). Animate motion is located at the most general level 
of this taxonomy and refers to motion of animate entities characterized by visual motion 
cues, such as self-propulsion and acceleration-deceleration sequence that trigger 
animacy perception in adults. Biomechanical motion, as defined by Moore (2012), is 
used to refer to motion of legged vertebrates (i.e. bipeds and quadrupeds). Motion of 
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legged vertebrates is characterized by the same motion cues that define animate motion 
but in addition these cues of motion are also bound to the constraints of the vertebrates’ 
skeleton. Finally, human motion refers only to motion of human beings where 
kinematic cues that define animate motion are constrained by the human body that 
possesses arms and legs vertically aligned. 
 
 
Figure 1.1 Schematic representation of the Taxonomy of the kinematics of living 
beings 
 
Previous findings demonstrated that adults, simply by analyzing kinematics 
information, can retrieve multiple types of social information such as gender, emotion 
and identity that are relevant for detecting and interacting with others. (i.e. Dittrich, 
Troscianko, Lea, & Morgan, 1996; Troje & Westhoff, 2006; Hirai, Saunders & Troje, 
2011). Indeed, studies conducted with adults demonstrated that brain areas involved in 
the Social Brain network are sensitive to motion that characterized humans. As 
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aforementioned, it has been demonstrated that brain regions of adults’ brain, such as 
STS, selectively respond human motion (Pavlova, 2012). Stimuli employed with adults 
were complex arrays of dots (point-light display, PLD, Johansson 1973; 1976) in which 
the only retrievable information is kinematic. 
 From a developmental perspective, several studies which employed PLDs with 
human newborns and infants, demonstrated that babies are able to discriminate and 
prefer human motion rather than other type of motion, such as random motion (Fox & 
McDaniel, 1982; Bidet-Ildei, Kitromilides, Orliaguet, Pavlova, & Gentaz, 2014). This 
evidence guides authors to hypothesize that our visual system might be equipped of a 
visual filter specifically tuned for perceiving motion of vertebrates’ legs (Troje e 
Westhoff, 2006; Johnson 2006; for a complete description of the model see Chapter 3).  
There is no doubt that motion is one of the most powerful visual cues that 
triggers newborns’ attention. As suggested by Troje and Westhoff (2006) and Johnson 
(2006), the visual filter tuned for the perception of motion of legged vertebrates might 
be present since birth. However, according to Neo/Neuro-Constructivist approach, it 
might be plausible to hypothesize that at birth our visual system possesses some general 
biases toward perceptual motion cues that characterize animate motion such as, for 
example, self-propulsion and acceleration-deceleration patterns. These biases might be 
the building blocks on which, during the development, humans built their ability to 
process quickly and accurately human motion.   
The aim of this thesis is to examine the emergence of the specialized cognitive 
system devoted to process kinematics of social agents and how inborn perceptual biases 
contribute to the development of the social brain. 
 29 
To this end, Chapter 2 will be devoted to the description of a series of 
experiments that investigate newborns’ sensitivity to some visual cues that in adults 
elicit animacy perception: self-propelled motion, directional and speed changes cues of 
motion. Moreover, percepts of animacy may also be driven by more specific types of 
motions cues, such as when the motion of a complex arrays of dots is organized and 
perceived as a particular form of human motion (i.e. human walker, Scholl & Gao 
2013). The infants’ ability to extract information of directionality from PLD of a human 
walker might be facilitated by the fact that motion information is conveyed by a PLD 
that represents the constraints of the human body. In light of this, as suggested by 
Frankenhuis and Barrett (2013), the detection and recognition of motion pattern when 
they are depicted as a human body might be facilitated by the action schemas that might 
be present in the infants’ motor repertoire. 
For this reason, in Chapter 3, 3- and 6-month-old infants, and adults were 
presented with a PLDs of a human walker to test their ability to extract directionality 
from complex arrays of dots, and to test how the information of directionality can 
trigger infants and adults’ attention toward the surrounding space.  
 
 
 
 
  
 30 
Chapter 2 
 
Newborns’ sensitivity towards visual cues of motion that trigger 
Animacy Perception
*
 
 
 
 
2.1 Animacy perception in adults 
 The world in which we are embedded is extremely complex. However, despite 
this complexity, adults, infants and even newborns can organize and structure it. The 
first and the most important way of making sense of the world is to identify and to 
differentiate social entities from non-social ones. The ability to discriminate between 
social and non-social entities might be considered the first step towards interaction with 
others. Moreover, from an evolutionary point of view, this distinction is also at the 
bases of survival for our species.  
 Due to its adaptive relevance, some authors hypothesized that, in the adult brain, 
the dichotomy and the discrimination between animate and inanimate objects is a 
domain-specific knowledge system that is supported by a specific neural mechanism 
(Caramazza & Shelton, 1998; Mahon & Caramazza, 2009; Schultz, Friston, O’ Doherty, 
Wolpert & Frith, 2005; Vallortigara, 2012). Additionally, according to the animate 
monitoring hypothesis (New Cosmides & Tooby, 2007), human adults possess an 
ancestrally derived domain-specific subsystem within visual attention, that is automatic, 
independent from beliefs, goals and acquired experience, for detecting the presence of 
                                                 
*
 Part of the content presented in this chapter has been described in the following published article: Di 
Giorgio, E., Lunghi, M., Simion, F., & Vallortigara, G. (2017). Visual Cues of Motion that trigger 
Animacy Perception at Birth: The Case of Self-propulsion. Developmental Science, 20(4).  
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animate beings and monitoring them (New et al., 2007; Pratt, Radulescu, Guo & 
Abrams, 2010).  
Whether the distinction between animate vs. inanimate objects is present from 
birth, on which visual cues is based, as well as how it develops thanks to the visual 
experience are intriguing open questions.   
Adults detect social agents not only on the basis of static visual cues such as 
facial features (Kanwisher, 2000), the presence of the eyes (Puce, Allison, Gore & 
McCarthy, 1995), and body structure (Downing, Jiang, Shuman & Kanwisher, 2001), 
but also on how they move, i.e., biological motion (Troje, 2013; Vallortigara, Regolin 
& Marconato, 2005; Vallortigara & Regolin, 2006). Even more interesting, also 
geometrical moving shapes can be perceived as animate by adults, a phenomenon 
known as perceptual animacy (Rutherford, 2013; Santos, David, Bente & Vogeley, 
2008; Scholl & Gao, 2013; Scholl & Tremoulet, 2000). In line with the main aim of this 
thesis, here I am concerned with this perceptual level, which can be considered 
consistent with the more basic level of animacy conceptualized by Scholl and Gao 
(2013), which suggests that phenomena of perceiving animacy reflects visual processing 
that is specialized for the extraction of animacy from visual motion. 
As first demonstrated by Hider and Simmel (1944), animations of simple 
geometrical shapes (i.e. a circle, a square and a triangle) that moves and interacts each 
other can elicit a perception of animacy solely based on kinematics information. 
Specifically, adults attributed internal states, intentions, emotions, and roles to the 
geometrical shapes, but the only thing that they saw were three different figures that 
moves on the monitor.  
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Starting from this pioneering study, and considering the importance of animacy 
in the study of social cognition, a wide number of researchers tried to identify the 
relevant trigger factors or constituents for human perception of animate motion. Self-
propelled motion, such as when an object begins to move without a perceivable external 
cause, has been identified as the most relevant or at least the most consistent 
determinant in animacy perception (Leslie, 1994; Stewart, 1984). Changes in direction 
(Dittrich & Lea, 1994; Scholl & Tremoulet, 2000; Szego & Rutherford, 2008; 
Tremoulet & Feldman, 2000), speed changes (Tremoulet & Feldman, 2000), 
discontinuity in motion trajectory, motion contingency, and violation of Newtonian 
laws (Gelman, Durgin & Kaufman, 1995; Santos et al., 2008; Bassili, 1976; Blakemore, 
Boyer, Pachot-Clouard, Meltzoff, Segebarth et al., 2003; Kaduk, Elsner & Reid, 2013) 
are other cues of motion that trigger animacy perception in adults. Motion contingency 
(spatial and temporal synchrony) has also been referred to as a fundamental requisite to 
perceive motion as animated (Bassili, 1976; Blakemore et al., 2003; Johnson, 2003; 
Johnson, Booth, & O’Hearn, 2001). Furthermore, the degree of interaction between 
objects (potential agents) also increases the impression of animacy (Dittrich & Lea, 
1994), which relates to perceiving the motion as goal-directed.  
However, researchers studying animacy perception employed relatively complex 
displays that involved the interaction between multiple moving shapes and 
environmental elements (obstacles, boundaries). More recently, researches tried to 
disentangle which specific motion cue mediates perceptual animacy using simple 
schematic displays. The use of simple display has clear advantages: it allows to 
researcher to manipulate exact motion parameters and to examine the effect of the cues 
of motion on the perception of animacy (Rutherford, 2013). A first study that employed 
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single visual object moving on a homogeneous background was done by Tremoulet and 
Feldman (2000). In this study, adult participants were presented with a single object that 
moves along a trajectory and suddenly accelerate and change its own trajectory. Results 
showed that adults perceived as more animate an object that change speed with an 
increasing of acceleration and also change direction more acutely. Subsequent research 
replicated and extended these findings: human adults consistently attribute higher 
animacy to single shapes moving against gravity and changing autonomously speed or 
direction of motion; for stimuli moving at a constant speed, the higher was the speed, 
higher was the animacy attribution (Gyulai, 2004; Szego & Rutherford, 2007, 2008). 
However, the origin of perception of animacy is still unclear. As mentioned 
before, some authors argued that animacy perception is supported by domain-specific 
mechanism (Premark, 1990, Biro & Leslie, 2007) and this mechanism is might be 
innate (Mandler, 2003). On the other hand, some authors state that animacy perception 
it might be supported by domain-general mechanism, such as associative learning, that 
through experience with specific kinds of entities babies become specialized to detect 
specific features of motion (Rakinson, Lupyan, Oakes & Walker-Andrews, 2008). 
Developmental studies might shed light and give some answers about the 
presence at birth of the sensitivity to visual motion cues that trigger animacy in adults.    
 
2.2   The origin of animacy perception 
 Since in adults, animacy phenomenon is based on fast and automatic visual 
processing, it is plausible to hypothesize that animacy perception has an early 
ontogenetic origin which is mainly constrained by a collection of low-level visual cues 
of motion. Developmental research has demonstrated that preverbal human infants are 
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able to distinct between animate and inanimate entities, and they also demonstrated that 
motion cues provide a decisive role in the classification of objects into these categories 
(Baker, Pettigrew & Poulin-Dubois, 2014; Gelman, 1990; Mandler, 1992; Poulin-
Dubois, Crivello & Wright, 2015; Premack, 1990; Saxe, Tzelnic & Carey, 2007; 
Spelke, Phillips & Woodward, 1995; Surian & Caldi, 2010; Träuble, Pauen & Poulin-
Dubois, 2014). Behavioral evidence has demonstrated that 12-month-old infants are 
sensitive to motion that characterize animate entities. Specifically, infants were tested 
with two different experimental conditions. In the first condition defined as stationary 
condition, infants were familiarized with a robot that remained stationary; in the second 
condition, namely self-propulsion condition, the robot starts to move autonomously and 
changes direction during its trajectory. Results showed that 12-month-old infants were 
surprised when the robot moves autonomously, suggesting that around the first year of 
life infants are sensitive to motion cues that characterize animate entities. Moreover, in 
the second experiment of the same study, 9-month-old infants underwent to the same 
experimental condition and also in this case, 9-month-old infants were surprised when 
the robot moves following the motion pattern that is characteristic of animate entities 
(Poulin-Dubois, Lepage & Ferland, 1996). Additionally, Kaduk and colleagues (2013), 
tested 9-month-old infants in a ERP study. Infants were presented with a simple 
geometrical shape that in one condition was moving in a self-propelled manner and was 
violating Newtonian laws of motion to induce a judgement that the object was animate, 
and in the other condition the object changes motion only due to external forces (i.e. 
inanimate condition). ERPs results, showed that infants allocate more attentional 
resources (i.e. more negative peak of NC component) to inanimate condition, 
suggesting that they were able to discriminate between animate and inanimate motion 
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based on motion cues. Moreover, another study tested younger infants, showed that cues 
of motion, such as self-propulsion can lead infants to attribute goals to the action of 
non-human agents. In the study conducted by Lou and Baillargeon (2005), 3- and 5-
month-old infants were tested with a familiarization paradigm in which an object (i.e. a 
box) suddenly starts to move and approach another object. Moreover, two experimental 
condition were present; in the first condition, namely, short handle condition, the box 
have short handle that is totally visible inside the apparatus; in contrast, in the second 
condition, namely long handle condition, the handle was longer and it went out of the 
apparatus make the motion of the box ambiguous. The ambiguity of the self-propelled 
motion, was due to the fact that infants did not know if the object was moving by a hand 
or not. Such ambiguity was not present in the short-handle condition, because the object 
start to move autonomously. Results showed that infants did not categorize the box as 
an agent when its handle extended out of the apparatus, making it unclear whether it 
moved by itself or not. Because the infants did not perceive the box as an agent, they 
did not interpret its action as goal directed. These findings suggest that infants can 
attribute goals to a non-human object when it is moving with motion pattern that is 
specific of animate entities (i.e. self-propulsion), suggesting that infants, also from 3 
months of age, use motion cues, such as self-propulsion, to distinguishing between 
animate and inanimate entities. (Lou & Baillargeon, 2005). This study demonstrated 
that infants use motion cues to categorize object. However, all these studies did not 
directly test infants’ sensitivity to motion cues that trigger animacy perception.  
Since studies on animacy perception have never involved infants younger than 3 
months of age, these studies can not exclude the possibility that experience during the 
first 3 months of life may shape the responses of infants towards animate objects. For 
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this reason, the studies present in literature did not answer to the question about the 
origin of animate vs. inanimate distinction and, therefore, studies on human newborn 
are needed.  
From a domain-specific viewpoint, it has been suggested that this precocious 
sensitivity to self-produced motion as a critical cue to differentiate animate from 
inanimate objects is due to the existence of an innate, domain-specific visual module 
present from birth (Premack, 1990). The primacy of motion as a cue for identifying 
animate entities has also been acknowledged by Mandler (2003), who proposed that 
infants develop knowledge about motion cues of animate entities through the innate 
process of perceptual analysis. In the same vein, other authors have hypothesized that at 
birth, infants possess separate core knowledge systems for animate and inanimate 
objects, and that they understand that constraints on motion that apply to physical 
objects may not hold true for animate beings (Spelke, 2004; Spelke & Kinzler, 2007). In 
contrast, according to a more domain-general view, as in associative learning, infants 
use learning mechanisms that operate across all domains of knowledge to encode 
statistical regularities in their environments. Therefore, infants learn about identities and 
properties of the objects that appear in self-propelled events through their experiences 
with specific kinds of entities that engage in these motions (Rakison et al., 2008; 
Rakison & Poulin-Dubois, 2001). 
The first evidence that can answer to the question whether animacy perception is 
present since birth, and without any kind of experience, came from studies that 
employed chicks as animal model. In the studies conducted by Mascalzoni and 
colleagues (2010) and by Rosa-Salva and colleagues (2016), chicks were tested without 
any kind of experience. It has been demonstrated that newly hatched chicks are 
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sensitive to self-propelled motion and speed changes. Mascalzoni and colleagues 
(2010), first demonstrated that chicks with no previous visual experience, shown a 
spontaneous preference for self-propelled visual cues of motion. Specifically, on their 
first day of life, chicks were exposed to an animation sequence depicting two oval-
shaped objects, and each object was a different color. In the animation sequence, a 
given object was set in motion either by self-propulsion (i.e. it started moving on its 
own) or by the application of an external force (i.e. by direct contact with a second 
object) or in a third case, motion onset was ambiguous, that is, at the time of motion 
onset the object was hidden behind occluding screens and therefore, no cues were 
provided about the nature of motion onset. After exposure to the animation sequences, 
the spontaneous preference of chicks for these scenarios was tested and chicks preferred 
the self-propelled object. These results demonstrated that the domestic chick, a highly 
precocial bird species, showed an innate sensitivity to self-propulsion and this may be 
because self-propulsion is a crucial cue to animacy. In the same way, Rosa-Salva and 
collaborators (2016) tested newly hatched chicks’ spontaneous preference for 
approaching an object that moves with a constant speed and trajectory, along a 
horizontal trajectory, compared to an identical object that suddenly linearly accelerated 
and then decelerated again to the original speed. Chicks showed a significant preference 
for the speed change stimulus. The visual preferences found in newborn visually naïve 
chicks for self-produced motion and speed changes seems to be at the basis of the 
predisposition for identifying animate creatures demonstrated that, at birth, visual 
system have some attentional biases to detect visual cues of motion that trigger animacy 
perception in adults. 
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What about human species? Does the ability to discriminate between animate 
and inanimate objects based on motion cues, described in chicks, also hold true in 
human newborns? 
To answer these questions the six experiments presented in this chapter 
investigate the visual cues of motion that are the precursors of animacy perception in 
adults. In the six experiments visual cues of motion, such as self-propelled motion, 
change in direction, and speed changes, were systematically tested. Using a visual 
preference paradigm, in the Experiment 1 self-propelled object were compare to 
ambiguous one (i.e. the moment when the object starts to move was hidden by an 
occluder). In the Experiment 2, change direction cues of motion were tested. Using the 
same paradigm of the Experiment 1, an inert object, which change direction only after a 
collision with an occluder, was compared to another identical object that, instead, 
change direction autonomously, without any external contact.  
In experiments 3, 4, 5, and 6 were tested speed changes visual cues of motion. In 
experiment 3 and 4, a single speed changes (acceleration, Experiment 3; deceleration, 
Experiment 4) were tested using a visual preference paradigm compared to an object 
that moves with a constant speed. In Experiments 5 and 6 the acceleration and 
deceleration was combined to test whether speed changes cues have an additive value in 
animacy perception in newborns. Findings with chicks and human adults (Gyulai, 2004; 
Rosa-Salva, Grassi, Lorenzi, Regolin & Vallortigara, 2016) demonstrate that also speed 
change is an important cue that trigger animacy perception. Moreover, results with 
adults and chicks, revealed that the acceleration and deceleration elicit perception of 
animacy when they are present together rather than singularly. In addition, results from 
Gyulai’s study (2004) suggest that in adults also the order of presentation counts. 
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Indeed, adults rate as more animate an object that suddenly accelerates and then 
decelerates rather than an object that decelerates and then accelerates. Also in these two 
last experiments, the speed changes event was compared to an object that moves with a 
constant speed.  
 
Experiment 1: Self-Propulsion – Visual preference paradigm 
The aim of Experiment 1 was to test the presence of an inborn sensitivity to a 
visual cue of motion that in adults triggers animacy perception such as self-propelled 
motion onset of an object when the object starts from rest on its own without any 
external force. Newborns were presented with two computer-generated events in which 
the visibility of the self-propelled motion onset of an object was manipulated (i.e. self-
propelled vs. ambiguous). In the self-propelled motion event, the object started from 
rest with a self-initiated visible movement; therefore, its initial starting motion was 
clearly visible and available to the babies. In contrast, in the ambiguous event the object 
appeared on the screen already in movement, so no cues about the onset of motion were 
available to newborns. As demonstrated in Mascalzoni and colleagues’ study (2010) 
with chicks in the present experiment newborns were tested with a single object that 
start to move autonomously (self-propelled event) compare to an object which start of 
motion was masked (ambiguous event). If newborns are sensitive to self-propelled 
motion cues, then they should prefer the event in which the onset motion of the object 
by self-propulsion is visible and not ambiguous. 
Method 
Participants 
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Eighteen full-term newborns were selected from the maternity ward of the 
Paediatric Clinic of the University of Padova. Data from six newborns were discarded 
because they became too tired or started crying during testing (n = 3) or showed a 
position bias (newborns looked in one direction more than 80% of the time, n = 3). 
Therefore, the final sample consisted of 12 newborns (seven males). Their postnatal age 
ranged from 13 to 98 h (M(age) = 40 h, SD = 27). All subjects met the normal delivery 
screening criteria, had a birth weight between 2380 and 4140 g (M = 3245 g, SD = 476), 
and had an Apgar score of 10 at 5 min. Newborns were tested only if awake and in an 
alert state, and after the parents had provided informed consent. All experimental 
procedures have been licensed by the Paediatric Clinic of the University of Padova. 
Apparatus and Procedures 
An infant-control preferential looking technique was used. Stimuli consisted of 
two animation events presented on an Apple LED Cinema Display (Flat Panel 30″) 
computer monitor (refresh rate = 60 Hz, 2560 x 1600). The baby sat on an 
experimenter’ s lap at a distance of approximately 30 cm from the monitor and white 
curtains were drawn on both sides of the newborn to prevent interference from 
irrelevant distractors. Eye movements were recorded with a video camera placed above 
the monitor, and the direction and duration of the first fixations, the total number of 
orienting responses and the total fixation time towards the stimuli were coded off-line. 
In accordance with Cohen (1972), I assumed that the number of orienting responses 
indexed an orienting mechanism, whereas duration of the first fixations, as well as the 
total fixation time, indexed a detection mechanism. At the beginning of each preference 
test trial, a red disc on a black background appeared to attract the infant’ s gaze to the 
center of the monitor. In a continuous fashion, the disc changed in size from small (1.8 
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cm) to large (2.5 cm) until the newborn’ s gaze was properly aligned with the red disc. 
The sequence of trials was then started by a second experimenter who watched the 
newborn’ s eyes through the video camera. When the newborn’ s gaze was aligned with 
the red disk, the second experimenter pressed a keyboard key that automatically turned 
off the central disc and activated the onset of the stimuli, thereby initiating the sequence 
of trials. Because stimuli were presented bilaterally on the left and the right side of the 
monitor with a convergent motion pattern (from peripheral to the central visual field), 
each newborn was given two paired presentations (trials 1 and 2) of the test stimuli. In 
each trial, the position of the stimuli was reversed (the initial left–  right order of 
presentation was counterbalanced across subjects) (Figure 2.1). A trial ended when the 
newborn did not fixate on the display for at least 10 s. Videotapes of the newborn’ s eye 
movements were coded off-line by a different observer, unaware of the stimuli 
presented. The mean estimated reliability between observers was Pearson’ s r = .98, p < 
.001. 
 
 
Figure 2.1 Schematic representation of visual preference paradigm 
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Stimuli 
Stimuli consisted of two animation events presented on a computer screen: a 
self-propelled motion event and a non-self-propelled motion event. Each event featured 
two occluders (grey rectangles with an area of 4 x 8.5 cm, 7.6° x 15.8° ), placed on the 
left and right, respectively, and one object (grey disc of 3 cm in diameter). In the self-
propelled motion event, the object was already present on the screen near the first 
occlude and after 0.5 s it started to move on its own towards the second occluder, until it 
completely disappeared behind it. In this event, there were cues about the self-propelled 
nature of the object in motion. In contrast, in the nonself- propelled motion event, the 
entrance of the object was ambiguous (i.e. masked), because it appeared already in 
motion emerging from behind the first occluder; therefore, no cues about whether 
motion onset was driven by self-propulsion or external force were available. After 
emerging from the first occluder, the object continued moving towards the second 
occluder (as occurred in the self-propelled event) but then it stopped in front of the 
second occluder for 0.5 s. I chose to include this 0.5-s stop to ensure that in both 
animation events, the two stimuli remained the same amount of time in a static position 
(i.e. 0.5 s at the beginning of the self-propelled motion event and 0.5 s at the end in the 
ambiguous display. Importantly, both objects moved with identical speed and covered 
the same distance; Figure 2.2). In this type of display, adult subjects perceive the object 
already present on the screen that started to move as a self-propelled object, compared 
to the object in the ambiguous display. Both events described lasted 4.5 s (84 frames, 25 
frames/s). Each object covered a distance of 11 cm at 4 cm/s and maintained both its 
starting and final position for 0.5 s. Videos were produced by looping the animations. 
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Each set of elements occupied an overall 10 cm window in width (20° visual angle at a 
viewing distance of 30 cm) (Figure 2.2). 
 
 
Figure 2.2 Schematic representation of stimuli employed in Experiment 1. On the 
left column, the self-propelled event; on the right column, the ambiguous event. 
 
Results 
The Kolmogorov-Smirnov goodness-of-fit test showed that the data were 
normally distributed. To establish whether the newborns showed a spontaneous visual 
preference for one of the two stimuli, separate two-tailed dependent samples t -tests 
were performed. When tested for their preference for a self-propelled motion event vs. 
an ambiguous motion event, newborns looked significantly longer at the self-propelled 
event (M = 41.6 s, SD = 18) than at the ambiguous one (M = 33.8 s, SD = 20.2), t(11) 
Self-Propelled Event Ambiguous Event
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=  2.3, p = .039 (Cohen’ s d =  .68). Ten out of 12 newborns preferred the self-propelled 
motion event compared to the other event (binomial test, p = .039). The percentage of 
total fixation time newborns spent looking at the self-propelled motion event was 
significantly above chance level of 50% (M = 58.2%, SD = 10), t(11) = 2.9, p =  .014 (d 
=  .84). As regards the number of orientations, newborns did not look significantly more 
frequently to self-propelled motion event (M = 12.1, SD = 4.3) compared to the 
ambiguous one (M = 10, SD = 4.7), t(11) =  1.4, p =  .17, ns (Figure 2.3). 
 
 
Figure 2.3 Average total fixation time (s) and number of orientations for the self-
propelled motion and the ambiguous events in Experiment 1. Significant 
differences (p < .05) are marked with “*”  
 
 
With respect to the duration of the first orientation, babies looked longer at the 
self-propelled motion event first (M = 7.3 s, SD = 4) compared to the ambiguous event 
(M = 5 s, SD = 3.2), t(11) =  2.6, p =  .025 (d =  .75). In addition, in test phase 1, 7 out 
of 12 newborns oriented first at the self-propelled motion event (binomial test, p = .77, 
ns), and in test phase 2, 6 out of 12 newborns oriented first to the self-propelled motion 
event (binomial test, p = .26, ns). Of note, in the self-propelled motion event, the first 
look measure does not begin at the exact time when the object starts to move. This is 
because at the beginning of each loop event, there is a 0.5-s time in which the object 
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remains present on the screen. For this reason, I decided to conduct further analyses in 
order to investigate whether the sudden onset motion per se attracted newborns’ 
attention. I analyzed the location where newborns were looking at the exact time when 
the object started to move. To do so, I calculated the total number of orientations 
towards the object that started to move on its own and divided this number by the total 
number of orientations towards both stimuli at the same exact time, x100. If the sudden 
onset motion per se triggers newborns’ attention, then I should find that newborns look 
more frequently at the sudden onset motion in the self-propelled motion event. But this 
was not the case. The percentage of the number of orientations toward the onset motion 
of the object vs. motion in ambiguous display at the time when the object started to 
move was not above the chance level of 50% (M = 54.2% SD = 11.7, one sample t -test 
t (11) = 1.2, p = .24, ns. Finally, I carried out a further analysis by examining the 
looking behavior of newborns when the object started to disappear in the self-propelled 
motion event, in order to investigate an alternative explanation for the significant results 
obtained here, that is a possible preference for a disappearance event. Specifically, I 
analyzed the location where newborns were looking at the exact time when the object 
started to disappear behind the occluder in the self-propelled display (end of the event). 
I decided to concentrate the analyses on the exact time when the object started to 
disappear behind the occluder because all newborns, once their attention is captured by 
that exact time, continued to look at the disappearance event throughout its duration. If 
the disappearance event per se triggers newborns’ attention, then I should find that 
newborns look more frequently (i.e. made more orientations) at the object that 
disappeared. However, the percentage of the number of orientations toward the 
disappearing object, calculated as the total number of orientations towards the 
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disappearing object divided by the total number of orientations towards both stimuli at 
the same exact time, x 100, is not above the chance level of 50% (M = 51%, SD = 12, 
one sample t -test (11) = .23, p = .82, ns). I can conclude that the results in Experiment 1 
are not due to a preference for a disappearance event (self-propelled) over an object 
appearance event.  
 Overall, Experiment 1 showed that newborns prefer the self-propelled motion 
event, where an object starts to move on its own without an external force, in contrast to 
an event in which the entrance of the object is ambiguous, where no visual cues about 
the onset of its motion are available. 
 
Experiment 2: Change in Direction - Visual Preference Paradigm 
As well as the onset of motion by self-propulsion, changes in trajectory direction 
by self-propulsion are important visual cues in triggering animacy perception in both 
adults (Tremoulet & Feldman, 2000) and infants (Luo, 2011; Luo & Baillargeon, 2005). 
In Experiment 2, the entrance of the object was masked as in the ambiguous event of 
Experiment 1; for this reason, it appeared on the screen already in movement. In the 
case of the self-propelled motion event, the object changed its trajectory, to move in the 
opposite direction, and stopped at the center of the screen (without encountering either 
occluder). In contrast, in the inert event, the object changed its trajectory towards the 
opposite direction after contacting an occluder, and then stopped at the center of the 
screen. In this experiment, the perceptual cue that revealed self-propelled motion was 
the change of direction with and without an external force (the occluder).  
Method 
Participants 
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The final sample comprised 12 healthy, full-term newborns (five males). Their 
postnatal age ranged from 14 to 175 h (M(age) = 44 h, SD = 42). All of them met the 
screening criteria of normal delivery, had a birth weight between 2185 and 3970 g (M 
= 3087.9 g, SD = 508), and had an Apgar score of 10 at 5 min. Two babies were 
excluded from the final analyses because they changed their state during testing. 
Apparatus and Procedure 
The apparatus and the procedure were identical to that used in Experiment 1. 
The mean estimated reliability between coders was Pearson’ s r = .87, p < .01. 
Stimuli 
Stimuli consisted of two animation events presented on a computer screen (a 
self-propelled motion event and non-self-propelled motion event) and, as in Experiment 
1, each event featured two occluders on the left and right (grey rectangles with an area 
of 3 x 8.5 cm) and one object (grey disc of 3 cm in diameter). Unlike the previous 
experiment, in this case the entrance of the object was masked (or ambiguous) in both 
events, because it appeared from behind the occluder already in motion, so no cues 
about the onset (by self-propulsion or by external force) of its motion were available. 
Therefore, the two events were equivalent with regard to the nature of the onset motion 
of the object. However, in the self-propelled motion event, the object changed its 
trajectory direction and went back and stopped at the center of the animation event 
without any contact with the occluder (the distance between the object and the occluder 
was 1 cm). In contrast, in the inert event, the object changed its trajectory direction by 
contacting the occluder and then went back and stopped at the center. In both events, the 
object remained at the center of the animation event for 0.5 s; thereafter the animated 
sequence restarted (Figure 2.4). Therefore, contrary to Experiment 1, here the visual cue 
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that revealed self-propelled motion was a change of direction with and without an 
external force (the occluder). 
 
 
Figure 2.4 Schematic representation of stimuli employed in Experiment 2. On the 
left column, the self-propelled event; on the right column, the inert event. 
 
Results 
Since data were normally distributed as indicated by the Kolmogorov-Smirnov 
goodness-of-fit test, separate two-tailed dependent samples t -tests were performed. 
Newborns did not look significantly longer at the self-propelled motion event (M = 47.5 
s, SD = 15.3) compared to the inert event (M = 45 s, SD = 24), t(11) = .39, p = .70, ns) 
(Figure 2). Eight out of 12 newborns preferred to look at the self-propelled motion event 
compared to the inert event; the binomial test did not reveal any statistically significant 
effect (binomial test, p = .39, ns). The percentage of total fixation time newborns spent 
Self-Propelled Event Inert Event
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looking at the self-propelled motion event was not significantly above chance level of 
50% (M = 54%, SD = 12), t(11) = 1, p = .31). With regard to the number of 
orientations, newborns did not look more frequently at the self-propelled motion event 
(M = 14.3, SD = 3.6) compared to the inert one (M = 14, SD = 6.3), t(11) = .25, p = .81, 
ns (Figure 2.5). 
Finally, with regard to the duration of the first orientation, newborns did not look longer 
at the self-propelled motion event (M = 6.4 s, SD = 3.6) compared to the inert event (M 
= 6.4 s, SD = 4.2), t(11) = .03, p = .97, ns). In both test phases, 9 out of 12 newborns 
oriented first towards the self-propelled motion event, and the binomial test did not 
reveal any statistically significant effect (binomial tests, p = .15, ns). 
 
Figure 2.5 Average total fixation time (s) and number of orientations for the self-
propelled motion and the inert events in Experiment 2. 
 
Overall, Experiment 2 showed that newborns did not prefer the self-propelled 
motion event, where an object changes direction on its own without an external force, in 
contrast to an inert event in which the object changes its trajectory direction by 
contacting the occluder.  
 
Experiment 2a: Change in Direction – Habituation Paradigm 
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Data from Experiment 2 showed that newborns did not prefer an object that 
changed its trajectory direction on its own, without contact with an external force. This 
result seems to suggest that when visual cues about the onset of motion of an object by 
self-produced motion were no longer available, newborns did not show any visual 
preference. However, this null result should be interpreted with caution, because it 
could be the case that the newborns simply were not able to discriminate between the 
two stimuli. Experiment 2a aimed at testing whether newborns were capable of 
discriminating, after habituation, the two stimuli presented in Experiment 2. 
Participants 
Seventeen healthy, full-term newborns took part in the experiment. Data from 
four babies were discarded because they changed their state during testing (n = 3) or 
because of position bias (n = 1); therefore, the final sample consisted of 13 newborns 
(10 males). Their postnatal age ranged from 12 to 120 h (M(age) = 57.9 h, SD = 38.6). 
All of them met the screening criteria of normal delivery, had a birth weight between 
2510 and 4150g (M = 3245 g, SD = 630), and had an Apgar score of 10 at 5 min. 
Apparatus and Procedure 
The apparatus was the same as in the two previous experiments. Regarding the 
procedure, the experiment was carried out using an infant-control habituation setup 
(Horowitz, Paden, Bhana & Self, 1972). Infants were judged to have habituated when, 
from the fourth fixation onward, the sum of any three consecutive fixations was 50% or 
less of the total of the first three fixations (Slater, Earle, Morison & Rose, 1985). Half of 
the newborns habituated to the self-propelled motion event (i.e. the object that changed 
its trajectory direction without contact with an occluder), whereas the other half 
habituated to the inert event (i.e. the object that changed its trajectory direction after 
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contacting an occluder). During the habituation phase, the same stimuli were presented 
side-by-side. The stimuli remained on the screen until the habituation criterion was 
reached. The habituation phase was followed by two preference tests in which a familiar 
event and a novel one were presented side-by-side. The left– right position of the 
stimuli was reversed from the first to the second presentation. Looking at one stimulus, 
generally the novel one, for a longer period of time indicated discrimination and 
recognition. During the preference test phase, the experimenter recorded the duration of 
the infant’ s fixation on each stimulus. The presentation lasted until the infant had 
fixated on each stimulus on least once and a total of 20 s of looking had been 
accumulated. 
Stimuli 
Stimuli were the same employed in Experiment 2. 
Results 
All newborns reached the habituation criterion. A oneway analysis of variance 
was run to compare the total fixation times to reach the habituation criterion for the two 
groups of subjects that had habituated to the self-propelled motion event (M = 51.2 s, 
SD = 13) or the inert event (M = 43.7 s, SD = 14.8). The results of the comparison were 
not significant, F(1,12) = .93, p = .36, ns. To test whether newborns were able to 
recognize and discriminate between the novel stimulus and the familiar one, a novelty 
preference score (percentage) was computed. The time that each infant spent looking at 
the novel stimulus during the two test presentations was divided by the total time spent 
looking at both test stimuli during the two presentations, and subsequently converted 
into a percentage score. Hence, only scores that were significantly above 50% indicated 
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a preference for the novel stimulus. The mean novelty preference score was 58% (SD 
= 11.3), which differed significantly from the chance level of 50%, t(13) = 2.4, p = .031 
(Cohen’ s d = .68) (Figure 2.6). 
 
Figure 2.6 Average novelty preference in Experiment 2a. 
 
 
Overall, these results do not support the assumption that the lack of preference 
found in Experiment 2a was due to an inability to discriminate between the two stimuli. 
Newborns were sensitive to differences between the two stimuli and, therefore, were 
able to discriminate and recognize the familiarized stimulus. 
 
Experiments 3-4-5-6: Speed Changes 
The aim of this second series of experiments was to test the presence of an 
inborn sensitivity to a visual cue of motion that in adults triggers animacy perception 
such as speed changes (i.e. acceleration and deceleration). In four different experiments 
(3, 4, 5, 6) newborns were tested with a visual preference paradigm. In Experiment 3 
and 4, a single speed changes (acceleration, Experiment 3; deceleration, Experiment 4) 
were tested using a visual preference paradigm compared to an object that moves with a 
constant speed. In addition, to test the additive value of speed changes motion cue in 
Experiment 5 acceleration and deceleration was combined. In Experiment 5, the speed 
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changes event was an object that enter in the screen and it moves along and horizontal 
trajectory and after a third of the trajectory suddenly accelerates and then decelerated 
returning to the initial speed. As demonstrated in Rosa-Salva and colleagues’ study 
(2016) with chicks in the present experiment newborns were tested with a single object 
that suddenly change its speed compare to an object that moves with constant speed. If 
newborns are sensitive to speed changes, then they should prefer the event in which the 
object suddenly change its speed rather than the object that move with constant speed. 
Moreover, to test if order of presentation of two speed changes have effect on 
animacy perception as demonstrated in adults (Gyulai, 2004), in Experiment 6, the 
speed changes were presented with inverted sequence of presentation compared to 
stimuli employed in Experiment 5. Whether the order of presentation have play a role 
on animacy perception since birth, newborns have to show a different pattern of results 
in Experiments 5 and 6. 
Also in these two last experiments, the speed changes event was compared to an 
object that moves with a constant speed.  
 
Experiment 3: Speed Change - Single acceleration - Visual Preference Paradigm 
As well as the onset of motion by self-propulsion, speed changes are important 
visual cues in triggering animacy perception in both adults (Tremoulet & Feldman, 
2000) and chicks (Rosa-Salva et al., 2016). In Experiment 3, newborns were presented 
with two computer-generated events in which the speed of an object was manipulated 
(i.e. accelerated vs. constant). In the accelerated event the object after a third of its own 
trajectory suddenly accelerates and continued its trajectory with accelerated motion 
patter.  In contrast, in the constant event the object keep its initial speed along all its 
 54 
trajectory. If newborns are sensitive to speed changes motion cues, then they should 
prefer the event in which the object suddenly accelerates rather than the event in which 
the object keep constant speed.  
Participants 
Thirteen (4 males) full-term newborns took part at the experiment 3. Only one 
participant was discarded from the final sample because it showed a position bias. The 
final sample was of 12 newborns (1 males). Their postnatal age ranged from 13 to 144 h 
(M(age) = 55 h, SD = 43). All subjects met the normal delivery screening criteria, had a 
birth weight between 2600 and 3930 g (M = 3421 g, SD = 406), and had an Apgar score 
of 9 at 5 min. Newborns were tested only if awake and in an alert state, and after the 
parents had provided informed consent. All experimental procedures have been licensed 
by the Paediatric Clinic of the University of Padova. 
Apparatus and Procedure 
 The apparatus and the procedure were the same used in experiment 1. The mean 
estimated reliability between coders was Pearson’ s r = .95, p < .02. 
Stimuli 
Stimuli consisted of two animation events presented on a computer screen: an 
accelerated motion event and a linear motion event. Unlike the previous experiments in 
these stimuli no occluders are present. In both event, the entrance of the objects was 
ambiguous, and the object appeared already in motion emerging from the external limit 
of the white background. After the entrance, the object continued to move towards the 
center of the screen and, at the end, it disappeared. In the acceleration motion event the 
object suddenly accelerated its speed at one third (5.3 cm, 10.02°) of the distance (16 
cm, 28.07°). The speed change from 1.76 cm/s to 3.2 cm/s. In contrast in the linear 
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motion event the object cover the same distance (16 cm) at a constant speed of 2.6 cm/s. 
Both events described lasted 6 s (150 frames, 25 frames/s). Videos were produced by 
looping the animations (Figure 2.7). 
 
 
Figure 2.7 Schematic representation of stimuli employed in Experiment 3. On the 
left column, the accelerated event; on the right column, the constant event. The red 
arrow indicates a change of speed 
 
Results 
Since data were normally distributed as indicated by the Kolmogorov-Smirnov 
goodness-of-fit test, separate two-tailed dependent samples t-tests were performed. 
Newborns did not look significantly longer at the accelerated event (M = 62.49 s, SD 
= 15.3) compared to the constant event (M = 72.63 s, SD = 24), t(11) =  - 1.092, p 
=  .298, ns). Seven out of 12 newborns preferred to look at the accelerated motion event 
compared to the constant event; the binomial test did not reveal any statistically 
significant effect (binomial test, p = .77, ns). The percentage of total fixation time 
newborns spent looking at the accelerated event was not significantly above chance 
Accelerated Event Constant Event
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level of 50% (M = 48%, SD = 13), t(11) =  -.66, p = .52). With regard to the number of 
orientations, newborns did not look more frequently at the accelerated event (M = 17, 
SD = 5.6) compared to the constant one (M = 17, SD = 6.9), t(11) =  .29, p =  .77, ns . 
Finally, with regard to the duration of the first orientation, newborns did not look longer 
at the accelerated event (M = 10.26 s, SD = 8.5) compared to the constant event (M 
= 12.95 s, SD = 12.9), t(11) =  .57, p =  .57, ns) (Figure 2.8).  
 
Figure 2.8 Average total fixation time (s) and number of orientations for the self-
propelled motion and the inert events in Experiment 3. 
 
Overall, Experiment 3 showed that newborns did not prefer the accelerated 
motion event, where an object suddenly accelerates rather than the constant event in 
which the object keeps the same speed along its trajectory.  
 
Experiment 4: Speed Change – Single Deceleration – Visual Preference Paradigm 
Data of Experiment 3 revealed that newborns did not prefer an object that 
suddenly accelerates rather than an object that moves with constant speed. It might 
plausible to hypothesized that a single speed change in acceleration is not easy to be 
detected to newborns’ visual system and for this reason newborns did not show a 
preference because they did not perceive a difference between the two events. Speed 
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changes in terms of deceleration it might be easier to be detected by newborns’ visual 
system; for this reason, in Experiment 4, a different sample of newborns were presented 
with an object that suddenly decelerate, instead accelerate, compared to an object that 
moves with a constant speed.  
Participants 
Seventeen (10 males) full-term newborns took part at the experiment 4. 6 were 
discarded from the final sample because they changed their state during testing (n=3) or 
showed a position bias (n=3). The final sample was of 11 newborns (8 males). Their 
postnatal age ranged from 12 to 50 h (M(age) = 29 h, SD = 13). All subjects met the 
normal delivery screening criteria, had a birth weight between 2440 and 4040 g (M = 
3379 g, SD = 509), and had an Apgar score of 9 at 5 min. Newborns were tested only if 
awake and in an alert state, and after the parents had provided informed consent. All 
experimental procedures have been licensed by the Paediatric Clinic of the University 
of Padova. 
Apparatus and Procedure 
 The apparatus and the procedure were the same used in Experiment 1. The mean 
estimated reliability between coders was Pearson’ s r = .86, p = .03. 
Stimuli 
Stimuli consisted of two animation events presented on a computer screen: a 
decelerated motion event and a linear motion event. From a pictorial point of view, the 
stimuli were identical to the stimuli used in experiment 3. Unlike the stimuli used in the 
previous experiment, in deceleration motion event, the object suddenly decelerated its 
speed at one third (5.3 cm, 10.02°) of the distance (16 cm, 28.07°). The speed change 
from 3.2 cm/s to 1.76 cm/s. In contrast in the linear motion event the object cover the 
 58 
same distance (16 cm) at a constant speed of 2 cm/s. Both events described lasted 7.5 s 
(188 frames, 25 frames/s). Videos were produced by looping the animations.  
Results 
The Kolmogorov-Smirnov goodness-of-fit test showed that the data were 
normally distributed. To establish whether the newborns showed a spontaneous visual 
preference for one of the two stimuli, separate two-tailed dependent samples t -tests 
were performed. When tested for their preference for a decelerated event vs. an constant 
motion event, newborns did not look significantly longer at the decelerated event (M = 
51.23 s, SD = 21.6) compared to the constant event (M = 54.41 s, SD = 20.92), t(10) = - 
4.88, p = .636, ns). Four out of 11 newborns preferred to look at the decelerated motion 
event compared to the constant event; the binomial test did not reveal any statistically 
significant effect (binomial test, p = .549, ns). The percentage of total fixation time 
newborns spent looking at the decelerated motion event was not significantly above 
chance level of 50% (M = 49%, SD = 11), t(10) =  -.197, p =  .848). With regard to the 
number of orientations, newborns did not look more frequently at the decelerated event 
(M = 13, SD = 4.2) compared to the constant one (M = 13, SD = 5.2), t(10) =  -.327, p 
=  .75, ns . Finally, with regard to the duration of the first orientation, newborns did not 
look longer at the decelerated event (M = 8.29 s, SD = 6.48) compared to the constant 
event (M = 8.29 s, SD =  5.26), t(10) =  .000, p =  1.00, ns) (Figure 2.9). 
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Figure 2.9 Average total fixation time (s) and number of orientations for the self-
propelledmotion and the inert events in Experiment 4. 
 
Overall, results of Experiment 4 seem to suggest that even a single speed change 
in term of deceleration is not sufficient for newborns to prefer a stimulus that change its 
speed rather than a stimulus in which the object keeps it speed constant.  
 
Experiment 5: Speed Change – Acceleration - Deceleration pattern – Visual 
Preference Paradigm 
Results of Experiment 3 and 4, showed newborns did not show any spontaneous 
preference for speed changes motion cues, in terms of acceleration and deceleration 
when they are presented singularly. However, in previous studies did with chicks and 
humans adults (Gyulai, 2004; Rosa-Salva et al., 2016) speed changes (i.e. acceleration 
and deceleration) were presented combined and it might be that speed changes as well 
other cues of motion, have an additive value in animacy perception. In this light, in 
Experiment 5, acceleration and deceleration were combined. Newborns were presented 
with two computer-generated events in which the speed of an object was manipulated 
(i.e. accelerated-decelerated vs. constant event). In the accelerated-decelerated (AD) 
event, the object at one third of its trajectory suddenly accelerates and after another third 
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decelerates, returning to its original speed. In contrast, also in this experiment, in the 
constant event the object keeps constant its speed along its trajectory.  
If speed changes have an additive value since birth also in human species, 
newborns have to show a preference for the object that moves according to the 
accelerated-decelerated pattern rather than the object that moves with constant speed.  
Participants 
Seventeen (12 males) full-term newborns took part at the Experiment 5. 4 were 
discarded from the final sample because they changed their state during testing (n=3) or 
showed a position bias (n=1). The final sample was of 13 newborns (11 males). Their 
postnatal age ranged from 12 to 144 h (M(age) = 63 h, SD = 35). All subjects met the 
normal delivery screening criteria, had a birth weight between 2510 and 3975 g (M = 
3235 g, SD = 406), and had an Apgar score of 10 at 5 min. Newborns were tested only 
if awake and in an alert state, and after the parents had provided informed consent. All 
experimental procedures have been licensed by the Paediatric Clinic of the University 
of Padova. 
Apparatus and Procedure 
 The apparatus and the procedure were the same used in experiment 1. The mean 
estimated reliability between coders was Pearson’ s r = .90, p = .02. 
Stimuli 
Stimuli consisted of two animation events presented on a computer screen: an 
accelerated-decelerated motion event and a constant motion event. From a pictorial 
point of view, the stimuli were identical to the stimuli used in experiment 3 and 4. 
Unlike the stimuli used in the previous experiments, in acceleration-deceleration motion 
event, the object suddenly accelerated, its speed at one third (5.3 cm, 10.02°) of the 
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distance (16 cm, 28.07°) and then decelerated. The speed change from 1.76 cm/s to 3.2 
cm/s and then 1.76 cm/s. In contrast in the linear motion event the object cover the same 
distance (16 cm) at a constant speed of 2 cm/s. Both events described lasted 8 s (200 
frames, 25 frames/s). Videos were produced by looping the animations (Figure 2.10).  
 
 
Figure 2.10 Schematic representation of stimuli employed in Experiment 5. On the 
left column, the accelerated-decelerated event; on the right column, the constant 
event. The red arrow indicates a change of speed. After two third of the trajectory 
the object in the accelerated-decelerated event returns to its original speed. 
 
Results 
Since data were normally distributed as indicated by the Kolmogorov-Smirnov 
goodness-of-fit test, separate two-tailed dependent samples t-tests were performed. 
Newborns looked significantly longer at the accelerated-decelerated event (M = 51.11 s, 
SD = 22.3) compared to the constant event (M = 38.34 s, SD = 10), t(12) = 2.85, p 
Accelerated-Decelerated 
Event
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=  .014). Eleven out of 13 newborns preferred to look at the accelerated-decelerated 
motion event compared to the constant event; the binomial test revealed statistically 
significant effect (binomial test, p = .022). The percentage of total fixation time 
newborns spent looking at the accelerated event was significantly above chance level of 
50% (M = 55%, SD = 7), t(12) =  2.403, p = .033). With regard to the number of 
orientations, newborns did not look more frequently at the accelerated-decelerated event 
(M = 15, SD = 6.8) compared to the constant one (M = 16, SD = 5.3), t(12) =  -.44, p 
=  .665, ns. Finally, with regard to the duration of the first orientation, newborns did not 
look longer at the accelerated-decelerated event (M = 5.36 s, SD = 4.02) compared to 
the constant event (M = 6.4 s, SD = 2.8), t(12) =  -.809, p =  .43, ns ) (Figure 2.11).  
 
Figure 2.11 Average total fixation time (s) and number of orientations for the self-
propelled motion and the ambiguous events in Experiment 5. Significant 
differences (p < .05) are marked with “*”  
 
 Overall, Experiment 5 showed that newborns prefer an object that change its 
speed according to AD pattern of motion compared to an object that keeps constant its 
speed. These results seem to suggest that event in newborns speed changes have an 
additive value in animacy perception. Indeed, when speed changes were presented 
singularly, newborns did not show any preference (Experiments 3 and 4). 
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Experiment 6: Speed Change – Deceleration-Acceleration pattern – Visual 
Preference Paradigm 
The aim of Experiment 6, was to test if the order of presentation of speed 
changes is a crucial perceptual feature also in newborns. Previous study that tested 
adults, revealed that adults rate as more animate an object that moves according to AD 
pattern rather than an object that moves with deceleration-acceleration pattern (DA; 
Gyulai, 2004). In this light, in Experiment 6 newborns were presented with the same 
stimuli of the previous experiment but the order of speed changes was inverted. If the 
order of presentation of speed changes have a role also in newborns’ perception it might 
be plausible hypothesized that in this experiment newborns might does not show a 
preference for the object that suddenly decelerate and then accelerate. 
Participants 
Fourteen (6 males) full-term newborns took part at the Experiment 6. Two 
newborns were discarded from the final sample because they changed their state during 
testing. The final sample was of 12 newborns (6 males). Their postnatal age ranged 
from 12 to 76 h (M(age) = 39 h, SD = 22). All subjects met the normal delivery 
screening criteria, had a birth weight between 2540 and 4105 g (M = 3276 g, SD = 489), 
and had an Apgar score of 10 at 5 min. Newborns were tested only if awake and in an 
alert state, and after the parents had provided informed consent. All experimental 
procedures have been licensed by the Paediatric Clinic of the University of Padova. 
Apparatus and Procedure 
 The apparatus and the procedure were the same used in experiment 1. The mean 
estimated reliability between coders was Pearson’ s r = .89, p = .03. 
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Stimuli 
Stimuli consisted of two animation events presented on a computer screen: a 
decelerated-decelerated motion event and a constant motion event. From a pictorial 
point of view, the stimuli were identical to the stimuli used in experiment 5. Unlike the 
stimuli used in the previous experiments, in deceleration-acceleration motion event, the 
object suddenly decelerated, its speed at one third (5.3 cm, 10.02°) of the distance (16 
cm, 28.07°) and then decelerated. The speed change from 3.2 cm/s to 1.76 cm/s and 
then 3.2 cm/s. In contrast in the linear motion event the object cover the same distance 
(16 cm) at a constant speed of 2.4 cm/s. Both events described lasted 6.5 s (163 frames, 
25 frames/s). Videos were produced by looping the animations.  
Results 
 The Kolmogorov-Smirnov goodness-of-fit test showed that the data were 
normally distributed. To establish whether the newborns showed a spontaneous visual 
preference for one of the two stimuli, separate two-tailed dependent samples t -tests 
were performed. When tested for their preference for a decelerated-accelerated event vs. 
an constant motion event, newborns did not look significantly longer at the decelerated-
accelerated event (M = 49.71 s, SD = 28.6) compared to the constant event (M = 49.03 
s, SD = 27.26), t(11) =  - 0.67, p =  .948, ns ). Four out of 12 newborns preferred to look 
at the decelerated motion event compared to the constant event; the binomial test did 
not reveal any statistically significant effect (binomial test, p = .38, ns). The percentage 
of total fixation time newborns spent looking at the decelerated-accelerated motion 
event was not significantly above chance level of 50% (M = 49%, SD = 12), t(11) =  -
137, p =  .894). Finally, with regard to the number of orientations, newborns did not 
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look more frequently at the decelerated-accelerated event (M = 13, SD = 4.9) compared 
to the constant one (M = 13, SD = 4.6), t(11) =  -.261, p =  .79, ns (Figure 2.12). 
 
Figure 2.12 Average total fixation time (s) and number of orientations for the self-
propelledmotion and the ambiguous events in Experiment 6.  
 
Overall, Experiment 7 demonstrates newborns did not show a preference for DA 
event compared to a constant event. This result, seems to suggest that the order of 
presentation of speed changes motion cues is a crucial perceptual feature also in 
newborns’ perception.  
Taken together, results obtained from Experiment 3, 4, 5, and 6, demonstrate 
that also newborns are sensitive to speed change motion cues. Specifically, results of the 
experiments that tested newborns’ preference for speed changes demonstrated that 
newborns are not sensitive to speed changes in general but their attention is specifically 
attracted by the combination of acceleration and deceleration and only when these cues 
of motion follow a specific order of presentation. Newborns seem to have an innate 
predisposition towards acceleration-deceleration pattern of kinematics (Experiment 5), 
and they do not have a bias towards single speed changes (Experiments 3, and 4) or 
when the order of presentation was inverted (Experiment 6).  
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Conclusions 
The aim of the present Chapter was to systematically test to which motion cues, 
that trigger animacy perception in adults, newborns are sensitive.  
Overall, results demonstrate that newborns are sensitive to the major motion 
cues such as self-propulsion, change in direction and change in speed and data of these 
experiments also demonstrate that speed changes cues must be presented together and in 
a precise order (i.e. acceleration must precede deceleration).   
Specifically, Experiment 1 demonstrated that newborns preferred a self-
propelled motion event compared to an ambiguous event in which no explicit visual 
cues about the motion onset of the object were available (i.e. the entrance of the object 
on the screen was masked or ambiguous due to the presence of an occluder). This result 
seems to suggest that an object that starts to move on its own attracts newborns’ visual 
attention. However, one might argue that the preference for a self-propelled motion 
event is a novelty response that comes from the sudden onset of motion and not from an 
appreciation of self-propulsion per se. Indeed, the possibility that sudden onset of 
motion per se is a more interesting display for newborns makes sense. However, 
newborns did not look more frequently at the exact time when the object started to 
move in the self-propelled motion event, demonstrating that the sudden onset motion 
per se did not grab newborns’ attention. Moreover, a second alternative explanation for 
the significant effect of Experiment 1 might be that newborns manifest a preference for 
a disappearance event over an object appearance event. This possible explanation can be 
discarded because newborns did not look more frequently at the object that disappeared 
behind the occluder in the self-propelled display during the end of the event, as 
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documented by the percentage of the number of orientations toward the disappearing 
object that was the not above chance level. 
 In Experiment 2, the entrance of the object on the screen was masked in both 
events, so no cues for the onset of motion were available, but only in the self-propelled 
motion event did the object changed its trajectory direction on its own without external 
force and external contact. The results from Experiment 2 demonstrated that newborns, 
even if they were able to discriminate between the two events, as shown in Experiment 
2, did not manifest any preference for the event in which the object changed its 
trajectory direction without external contact (i.e. self-propelled motion event) compared 
to an event where the object changed its trajectory direction only after an external 
contact with the obstacle (i.e. inert condition). It is worth pointing out that by 7 months 
of age, infants already associate change in direction and speed with animals (Träuble et 
al., 2014). However, in that study 7-month-old infants, that are older than newborns and 
with more visual experience of animate and inanimate objects, were presented with 
stimuli that changed both their direction and speed, while in study newborns were 
presented with only one specific visual cue of motion, which is trajectory direction 
change. It is plausible that different visual cues of motion together could have additive 
effects on animacy perception at birth.  
In Experiments 3, 4, 5, and 6, an object that changes in speed seems to attract 
newborns’ attention compared to an object that moves with constant speed. However, in 
Experiment 3 and 4, the lack of visual preference in both experiment seems to suggest 
that only a single speed change, either acceleration or deceleration, seems to not be a 
sufficient cue of motion that could elicit a visual preference in human newborns. More 
intriguing, newborns did not prefer the object that move with constant speed neither 
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even if, the constant speed object it should be easier to follow for newborns’ visual 
system (Johnson, 2011). As well as for change in direction, a single change in speed is 
not sufficient to elicit a visual preference. 
However, in experiment 5 and 6, two speed changes occur in the same stimulus. 
In experiment 5, newborns showed a visual preference for the object that suddenly 
accelerated and then decelerated compared to the same object that moves without any 
speed changes. The results of the experiment 6, instead demonstrate that the when a 
deceleration precedes an acceleration newborns did not prefer the events with speed 
changes or the constant event neither. Overall, the results of the Experiment 3, 4, 5 and 
6, suggest that newborns have some rudimentary attentional bias toward speed changes 
but they need to have sufficient information (e.g. two changes instead of one) and the 
sequence of the presentation of changes is important.   
The acceleration-deceleration (AD) pattern seems to be the most attractive 
combination of speed changes. It might be plausible to hypotheses that newborns 
manifest a preference only in this case because the AD pattern is the kinematic pattern 
that characterize biological motion and goal-directed actions (Fox & McDaniel, 1982; 
Troje, 2013). Specifically, when a human being starts to walk or to grasp an object, the 
foot or the hand, at the beginning accelerate and only when it approaches to an object or 
in proximity of a surface, decelerates.  
Overall the results of these six experiments support the view that several 
vertebrate species, including humans, have a primitive bias toward detecting social 
agents and attending to and preferentially processing sensory information about other 
living entities (Carey, 2009) such as motion. This evidence supports the idea that 
vertebrates, comprising phylogenetically distant species such as domestic fowls and 
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humans, have primitive neural pathways that ensure a bias to preferentially attend to 
and process sensory information about other living entities, as in the case of face and 
biological motion perception (Rosa-Salva, Farroni, Regolin, Vallortigara & Johnson, 
2011; Rosa-Salva, Mayer & Vallortigara, 2015; Rosa-Salva, Regolin & Vallortigara, 
2012; Simion, Di Giorgio, Leo & Bardi, 2011).  
Additionally, the results of the experiment presented in this Chapter support also 
the idea that animacy perception might be considered as a result of some low-level 
processes of the visual system (Rutherford, 2013). However, the newborns’ sensitivity 
to detect visual cues of motion that belongs to animate and not to inanimate things, does 
not imply that newborns possess abstract concepts of animacy or agency (Carey, 2009). 
The evidence that I found, suggests that since birth we have attentional biases that are 
pre-wired to detect specific cues of motion that belong to animate entities, such as self-
propulsion and AD pattern of motion. The sensitivity to perceptual cues of motion 
might be a sort of bootstrapping point to the development of the ability of adults and 
infants to extract social information from motion. As postulates by Carey (2009) the 
perceptual cues of motion, that trigger animacy perception in adults are the building 
blocks on which during development, infants built the abstract concepts of intentional 
agency (i.e. the precocious capacity to interpret the behavior of animate objects in terms 
of goals and motivational states) and mentalistic agency (i.e. mental states such as 
desires and beliefs). In the same vein, Leslie (1994; Biro & Leslie 2007) states that the 
perception of low-level visual cues of motion are the starting point on which humans 
build their high-order cognitive processes (namely mentalizing), such as for example 
attribution of propositional attitudes, such as beliefs and desires.  
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Taken together results of the six experiments presented, suggest that newborns 
have some attentional biases towards cues of motion such as self-propulsion and AD 
pattern of motion. These biases allow the system to focus attention towards these 
specific cues of motion also when they are embedded in complex arrays.  
Nevertheless, percepts of animacy may also be driven by more specific type of 
motion cues, such as when the relative motion of many points in point-light displays are 
perceived in terms of particular forms of vertebrates’ motion (Scholl & Gao, 2013). In 
light of this, in chapter 3, the visual cues of motion that trigger animacy perception were 
presented in a complex array of dots depicting a walking human figure to test if infants 
and adults, can use these visual cues of motion to extract social relevant information, 
such as directionality, from a complex array of dots. Moreover, the second aim of the 
Chapter 3 is also to test if directionality can trigger orienting of visuo-spatial attention 
both in infants and adults. 
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Chapter 3 
Visuo-Spatial orienting triggered by biological motion walking 
direction: a developmental trajectory 
 
Introduction  
As describe in Chapter 2, newborns are sensitive to motion cues that elicit 
animacy perception in adults. The results described in the previous chapter suggest that 
the visual system possesses some biases towards certain features of motion of animate 
entities, such as self-propulsion and acceleration-deceleration patterns Detection of 
animacy may also be driven by more specific types of motions cues, such as when the 
relative motion of many dots in a complex point light display are organized and 
perceived as a particular form of vertebrates’ motion such as a human walker, 
(Johansson, 1973; Scholl & Gao 2013). Specifically, in a complex array of dots, each 
single dot has self-propelled motion and follows the acceleration and deceleration 
pattern of motion. When these cues of motion are applied to dots that composed 
complex arrays, adults are able to extract, simply analyzing motion, a lot of social 
information. Moreover, it has been demonstrated that motion of local dots, particularly 
dots depicting feet, conveyed information such as directionality even if no translation is 
occurring and adults can use this information to orient attention towards the surrounding 
space (Shi, Weng, He, Jiang, 2010).  
Considering this literature, the aim of the present chapter is to examine the 
ability of infants to extract directionality from complex arrays of dots, and to test how 
the information of directionality can trigger infants’ attention toward the surrounding 
space and whether or not there are beneficial effects at a neural level. In the first 
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section, the literature and the theoretical models on perception of biological motion in 
adults and infants will be described along with studies that investigated the role of 
biological motion walking direction in inducing visuo-spatial orienting. In the second 
section two different experiments will be presented to test whether 3- and 6-month old 
infants extract information of directionality conveyed by a complex array of dots, such 
as a PLD depicting a walking human figure, and conveyed by cues of motion such as 
self-propulsion and AD pattern of motion, can trigger orienting of attention in infancy. 
The two experiments with infants of two different age levels, were aimed at 
investigating the neural correlates associated with the possible visuo-spatial orienting 
triggered by biological motion. To this aim high density event related evoked potential 
responses (ERPs) were recorded. An additional control group of adults was tested 
(Experiment 9) to investigates which are the neural correlates associated with the 
attentional orienting triggered by biological motion in the adult specialized system. 
 
3.1 Complex arrays of moving dots in adults: The case of biological motion. 
Motion of living beings, particularly vertebrates, is peculiar. When vertebrate 
moves, its limbs and torso undergo a specific pattern of motion constrained by the 
skeletal structure supporting the body. As results, spatial relation between some parts of 
the body remained invariants (i.e. distances between joints of the limbs), whereas spatial 
relation between other parts continuously change across the movement. Importantly, 
vertebrates’ motion has specific constrains also from a kinematic point of view. For 
example, when vertebrates walk, the pattern of motion of each single step has an 
accelerated-decelerated sequence. The acceleration phase preceded the deceleration at 
the beginning of each step (e.g. when the foot starts moving). On the other hand, 
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deceleration is at the end of the action, when the body parts are approaching a surface. 
(Figure 3.1).  
 
Figure 3.1 Schematic representation of the trajectory of walking. The swing phase 
is characterized by an acceleration at the beginning and by a deceleration when 
the stance phase occurs.  
 
The best way to study humans’ sensitivity towards motion, is to remove all 
pictorial information and to use only a dozen of dots, representing the major joints of 
vertebrates’ skeleton, that are moving according to the physical constrained of the body 
structure (point-light display, PLD). The first study that employed PLDs stimuli was 
done by Johansson (1973) to test if the human visual system applied some strategies to 
carry out an organization of a PLD depicted a human figure (structure from motion). 
Applying vector analysis’ model, Johansson assumed that human adults’ visual system 
can decompose motion in two different components related by a hierarchical relation: 
common motion and relative motion. Common motion refers to the information that can 
be retrieved from the global configuration of the complex array. On the contrary, 
relative motion refers to the analysis linked to local motion of each single element that 
constitutes the array. Results of Johansson’s study demonstrated that adults, only seeing 
a dozen of dots can organize them in a human figure only after 100/200 ms of exposure. 
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Moreover, in a second study, Johansson also discovered that with an exposure of 400 
ms, adults are able to discriminate and recognize the type of action the PLD is 
representing (Johansson, 1976). With these pioneering studies, Johansson shed light on 
adults’ ability to extract structure from motion only by looking at moving dots. In other 
words, adults, just viewing a dozen of dots that move together, can organize them into a 
coherent figure and they can distinguish and recognize the action that the PLD. 
Explanations of how observers extract form and action from these displays fall 
into two different classes: event-from-form and event-from-dynamics theories. Event-
from-form explanations suggest that visual processes first extract form, or parts of the 
form, and then determine the action. On the contrary, the event-from-dynamics 
approach is based on spatiotemporal information for action and argued that the most 
useful information is that about dynamics. (Shipley, 2003; Simion et al., 2008). 
However, biological motion cannot be only confined to PLDs depicting human 
walkers. Mather and West (1993) demonstrated that people could identify animals, such 
as camel, goat, baboon, horse and elephant whose movement were represented by point-
light displays. 
In addition, Pollick and colleagues (2001) tested adults’ ability to perceive 
motion of a human gestures conveyed by the arms, such as knocking and drinking. The 
author presented PLDs of a single arm that performed action. In so doing, Pollick and 
colleagues (2001) extended the definition of biological motion as suggested by 
Johansson: biological motion is not only the ambulatory pattern of terrestrial bipeds and 
quadrupeds but also the motion of body parts in isolation. For this reason, the term 
biological motion is currently used in literature to refer to studies that have investigated 
movements of living organisms such as people or animals - both whole body motion as 
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well as partial movements by feet, hands, head and eyes - to be studied by employing 
PLDs stimuli (Blake & Shiffrar, 2007; Moore, 2012).  
 
3.2 Taxonomies of biological motion 
Considering the heterogeneous corpus of studies that refer to biological motion, 
authors tried to classify different types of biological motion according to different 
aspects.  
A first classification is proposed by Moore (2012), that classified biological 
motion according to the types of stimuli employed in the studies differentiating between 
biological, biomechanical and human motion. The term biological motion is the most 
general level of motion, and it can be used to cover all forms of motion shown by 
animals, with the most basic level of motion characterized by self-starting irregular, 
partially contingent motion. Biomechanical motion is a more specific aspect of 
biological motion that is associated with having articulated moving limbs. This motion 
is showed by humans and many, but not all, animals. According to this distinction 
studies that implied PLDs of walking hen or other types of animals refers to 
biomechanical motion. Human motion, is the more specific level of the taxonomy 
proposed by Moore, and it refer to motion that is peculiar of human beings. Although, 
human motion is biological and contains biomechanical movements, human motion has 
specific properties that are constrained by the human skeleton, such as arms and legs are 
vertically aligned. 
Troje (2013) proposed a second taxonomy of biological motion. This 
classification is based on the differences between the experimental paradigms, the 
stimuli employed in the different research that tried, from Johansson till today, to 
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investigate humans’ ability to process humans (and animal) motion. The most general 
level of Troje’ taxonomy is defined as life motion. Life motion refers to all the studies 
that used realistic and stylized stimuli to study visual life motion. The first distinction is 
between “realistic” and “stylized”. Realistic level includes studies that used real stimuli, 
such as video, full computer animation or 3D avatars. The main problem with these 
stimuli is that kinematics information was not isolated for other social information such 
as faces. On the other hand, stylized is used to refer to all that studies that investigates 
kinematics index of human motion without any pictorial information. In light of this, at 
this level all studies that employed moving objects or complex arrays of dots were 
inserted. Stylized level is further differentiated between in Extrinsic and Intrinsic 
motion. Whilst, extrinsic motion is used to refer to studies that investigate animate 
motion and animacy perception elicit by motion of geometrical shapes (i.e. Heider and 
Simmel’s study), intrinsic motion, instead, refers to biological motion as defined by 
Troje: “biological motion is to use only to the study of the perception of intrinsic, 
deformable motion of animals and people by means of stimuli that are stylized in order 
to keep information conveyed by channels other than the kinematics of the body at 
minimum” (Troje, 2013 p. 27). In this vein, studies that employed PLDs are put inside 
the intrinsic level of Troje’s taxonomy. A further distinction of intrinsic motion is 
referring to the hierarchical nature of biological motion stimuli. Adults can retrieve 
information from biological motion analyzing two different levels of information: the 
global level and the local level of information. Global level refers to information that 
can be extracted from PLDs analyzing the configural information (i.e. Johansson’ 
common motion); local level instead is used to refer to information that can be retrieved 
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from analyzing the motion of each single dot (i.e. Johansson’ relative motion; figure 
3.2).   
 
 
Figure 3.2 Schematic representation of Troje’s taxonomy 
 
Based on this two taxonomies in the following paragraphs studies that 
investigate biological motion perception in adults (3.3) and infants (3.5) will be 
describe.  
 
3.3 Biological motion perception in human adults 
 Starting from Johansson’ studies (1973, 1976) a huge amount of experiments 
investigates which social information adults can retrieve form a point-light display.  
Data from empirical studies testing adults proved their ability to retrieve 
multiple sources of information from simple point-light displays depicting a human 
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figure, from actions (Dittrich, 1993), to emotions (Dittrich, Troscianko, Lea, & Morgan, 
1996) and gender (Kozlowski & Cutting, 1977). Importantly, this ability is observed as 
long as the stimuli are presented upright. Indeed, a decrease in recognition occurs when 
the stimuli are presented upside-down (Chang & Troje, 2009; Hirai, Chang, Saunders, 
& Troje, 2011; Pavlova & Sokolov, 2000; Sumi, 1984; Troje & Westhoff, 2006). The 
reduction in the ability to recognize biological motion in PLDs when are presented 
inverted it might be interpreted as evidence of an impaired processing of familiar shape 
of an articulated body (Sumi, 1984; Berthental & Pinto, 1994; Pavlova & Sokolov, 
2000). The role of configural invariants for processing biological motion was tested 
employing masked PLDs (i.e. stimulus which is mask by superimposing it with 
scrambled walkers). Berthental and Pinto (1994), tested adults with a detection task 
employing mask coherent walker embedded in scrambled walkers presented upright and 
inverted. Results showed that detection of walker figure was impaired when the 
stimulus was presented inverted suggesting that perception of biological motion might 
be driven by the analysis of global level of information. However, when an inverted or 
upright human body walking on hands instead of feet is presented to participants, adults 
are less accurate at detecting the former, so that the orientation of local dots motion 
seems crucial for recognition (Shipley, 2003). Taken together this evidence sheds light 
to the hierarchical nature of biological motion stimuli. Indeed, recent studies are mainly 
interested to discover which social information an adult can retrieve from the global 
shape of PLDs, and to discover the relation between global and local levels of 
information. Due to its hierarchical nature, some cognitive models were aimed at 
explaining the nature of computations supporting biological motion processing in adults 
have been elaborated (Troje & Westoff, 2006; Johnson, 2006; Troje, 2008).  
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3.3.1 Local and global information: a multi-level model 
 As well as other hierarchical social stimuli, such as faces, some authors suggest 
that distinct mechanism would be at the bases of biological motion detection.  
According to Troje and colleagues’ model (Troje & Westhoff 2006; Chang & 
Troje, 2009), at the base of the ability to analyze and to extract social information from 
biological motion there would be two distinct mechanisms. The first one, namely 
Perceptual Life Detector, would be an ontogenetically innate mechanism supported by 
subcortical structure. This mechanism would be present since birth, and it would be 
deputed to be sensitive to the motion of legged vertebrate appearing in the visual 
periphery and walking direction (Jonhson, 2006). Indeed, the oscillating movement of 
dots representing feet, is the best motion cues to detect and discriminate the walking 
direction of an animal. The Perceptual Life Detector would be shared with other 
mammals and phylogenetically ancient because the survival of the individuals would 
depend on it. The main function of this mechanism would be to detect others and this 
detection would be based of motion of the legs, and more specifically on the local 
motion of feet (Troje & Westhoff, 2006).  
On the other hand, the second mechanism, would not be an innate mechanism 
but an experience-dependent mechanism. The experience that the individuals have with 
conspecifics’ motion, because the Perceptual Life Detector is always active during life, 
shaped this second, cortical mechanism. Whilst the first mechanism is deputed to detect 
others based on motion, the experience-dependent mechanism would be responsible to 
recognize and identifying agents based on configural information. Moreover, the 
extraction of relevant social information would be supported by this mechanism (Chang 
& Troje 2009), and this information might be used to interpret other intentions and 
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depositions and moreover they might be used for specific tasks such as orienting 
attention.  
 
3.4 Biological motion and orienting of attention in adults 
3.4.1 Behavioral evidence 
 According to Troje and Johnson (Johnson, 2006; Troje & Westhoff 2006; Chang 
& Troje, 2009) the oscillating movement of dots representing feet, is the best motion 
cues to detect and discriminate the walking direction of an animal. In this vein, 
information of directionality can be retrieve from biological motion simply analyzing 
the local level of PLDs stimuli depicting a walking human, such as the pattern of 
motion of dots that represent the feet that move according to self-propulsion and AD 
pattern of motion (Hirai, Saunders & Troje, 2011). 
 Walking direction is an important attribute of biological motion, which provides 
critical information about another living creature’s dispositions and intentions and 
consequently it might plausible to hypothesized that also walking direction as well other 
social stimuli (i.e. eye gaze) can trigger an orienting of attention. Adapting cueing 
paradigm (Posner, 1980) several studies tested the possibility that walking direction can 
trigger orienting of attention in adults (Shi et al., 2010; Hirai et al., 2011; Bardi, et al., 
2015).  
Orienting of spatial attention can be either overt, when it is accompanied by eye 
movements, or covert, when attention is deployed to relevant locations without eye 
movements (Posner, 1980). Several studies using a cueing paradigm have shown that, if 
a peripheral stimulus (i.e. the target) is preceded by a directional stimulus (i.e. the cue) 
that predicts the side of appearing of the following target, adults show faster reaction 
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times to the target (i.e. the priming effect; Posner, 2016). Moreover, either overt and 
covert orienting of attention might be exogenous and endogenous: this distinction is 
related to the nature of processes and nature of stimuli employed during orienting of 
attention. Exogenous or bottom-up orienting of attention refers to the automatic, 
involuntary allocation of attention. On the contrary, endogenous or top-down orienting 
refers to the controlled, voluntary allocation of attention. The distinction is related also 
to the nature of stimuli employed as cue; generally exogenous cues are stimuli that need 
not be voluntary processed by participants, but they attract automatically attention (i.e. 
flash of light). Endogenous cues instead involved a voluntary process of cue such as, for 
example a word that indicates a precise spatial position (i.e. “left” or “right”; Posner 
1980; Peelen, Heslenfeld, & Theeuwes, 2014; Posner 2016).  
Walking direction, as well other social stimuli, such as eye gaze and body 
orientation, triggered orienting of attention toward peripheral space. Adults are faster 
and more accurate to respond to targets that appeared in a spatial position previously 
indicated by eye gaze direction (i.e. Friesen & Kingstone, 1998; Driver et al., 1999; 
Kingstone, Tipper, Ristic & Ngan, 2004; Hooker et al., 2003) and pictorial body 
structure (Gervais, Reed, Beall, & Roberts, 2010). 
The first study that employed PLDs walking direction as a cue to test viuo-
spatial orienting was carried out by Shi, Weng, He, & Jiang (2010). The authors 
recorded accuracy responses in a discrimination task. Results demonstrated that the 
walking direction of an upright point-light biological motion display induced an 
automatic shift of visuo-spatial attention in the observers. In this study, participants 
were asked to discriminate the orientation of a laterally presented gabor patch. The 
target was preceded by a point-light sequence depicting a human walker, an animal 
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walker, a static human point-light figure or a rolling point-light circle. Findings revealed 
that, although participants were explicitly told that the direction of the cue was not 
predictive of the position of the target, accuracy in a discrimination task was 
significantly better when the position of the target was congruent with the facing 
direction of an upright walking human or animal cue than when it did not. Intriguing, no 
significant effect was found when the cue was a rolling point-light circle and when PLD 
of human walker was presented static. This result revealed that automatic orienting of 
attention can be elicited by upright biological motion walking direction. Moreover, in 
the study of Hirai, Saunders and colleagues (2011), the latency to make a saccade to a 
peripheral target was measured under condition in which the location of the target was 
congruent or incongruent with the facing direction of a centrally presented point-light 
walker (upright or inverted). Participants were asked to orient their eyes either toward 
the right or the left according to the color of the cue. Results revealed that saccade 
latency and accuracy were affected by the facing direction of the central walker and this 
was true only when the cue was presented upright. Another study, using a Simon effect 
task, Bosbach, Prinz, & Kerzel (2004), observed a stimulus–response compatibility 
effect with point-light walkers. In this task, participants were asked to respond to the 
color of the dots representing the walker. Although the walking direction of the point-
light display was irrelevant for the task, responses were faster and less error prone when 
the facing direction of the walker and the response position corresponded than when 
they do not. Finally, an eye tracker study employing a cueing paradigm with a PLDs of 
human walkers as central cue, demonstrated that adults’ saccade latencies are faster 
toward target that appeared in congruent spatial position with the walking direction also 
when adults were not informed on the nature of the PLDs stimuli (i.e. they were not 
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informed that PLDs were human walkers). Moreover, also in this case, as well in Shi 
and colleagues’ study, the congruency effect is present only when the PLDs were 
presented upright and not inverted (Bardi et al., 2015). 
 
3.4.2 Electrophysiological evidence 
As suggested by Posner (1980; 2016), orienting of attention toward a 
surrounding space have a direct effect on visual processing of stimuli that appear in that 
portion of space. In other words, the consequence of orienting of visuo-spatial attention 
is a more proficient (i.e. faster reaction times and higher accuracy) visual process for 
stimuli that are present in a certain portion of the space where attention is located. As 
demonstrated by behavioral studies, orienting of attention toward cued stimuli is 
coupled with a facilitation in reaction time and in an increasing of accuracy to respond 
to them. Moreover, the behavioral findings were complemented by ERP studies that 
showed that orienting of attention toward a target modulates the P1 and N1 sensory 
components, supporting the idea that orienting of attention had sensory consequences 
(Carrasco, 2011). Several studies employed cue paradigm (Posner, 1980) with social 
stimuli as cue and recorded ERP target locked components. Employing eye gaze as cue, 
Schuller and Rossion (2001; 2004), recorded ERPs target-locked responses to 
investigates the time-course of the visual processing modulated by these reflexive shifts 
of attention. Findings revealed an enhancement of occipito-parietal sensory components 
(i.e. P1 and N1) for congruent rather than incongruent targets. Specifically, occipital P1 
(~110 ms) and occipito-parieto-temporal N1 (~150 ms) components were earlier and 
larger for congruent rather than incongruent targets. These results show that reflexive 
shifts of attention following eye gaze increase and speed up the processing of cued 
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visual information. Moreover, these findings provide evidence that attention can rapidly 
modify the processing of visual information in extrastriate cortex. Additionally, Tipper 
and colleagues’ study (2008) demonstrated that employing an ambiguous stimulus as 
cue ERP target locked responses were different in relation of the social relevance of the 
ambiguous stimulus. The authors used a geometrical shape of a triangles that could be 
interpreted either as an eye or the head of an arrow. Data indicate that although both eye 
gaze and arrow cues produced behavioral cueing effects, an attention-related sensory 
gain effect was present only for eye gaze cues. Specifically, also in this study the author 
found a greater amplitude of P1 component for congruent rather than incongruent 
targets only when the ambiguous cue were interpreted by participants as an eye. These 
results, seem to confirm that the social relevance of cue stimuli is particularly effective 
at highlighting sensory information being processed at the gazed-at location (Tipper, 
Handy, Giesbrecht, & Kingstone, 2008).  
  To date, only one study recorded ERP responses when the two dots depicted 
the feet of PLD human walker were presented as a cue (Wang, Yang, Shi, & Jiang, 
2014). 
Whereas other cueing studies (Schuller and Rossion 2001; Tipper et al., 2008) 
recorded ERPs target locked responses in Wang and colleague’ study (2014), the 
authors recorded cue-locked ERPs components demonstrating that encoding of spatial 
information provided by PLDs of biological feet motion induce an attentional orienting 
as already demonstrated by employing other social stimuli such as eye gaze. 
Specifically, results revealed that participants orient their attention towards the walking 
direction of feet motion sequences, which triggers an early directing attention negativity 
(EDAN) in the occipito-parietal region 100–160 ms after the stimulus onset. 
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Taken together, this behavioral and electroencephalographic evidence reveals 
that the walking direction of biological vertebrates can guide automatic shifts of 
attention in adult observers as was previously demonstrated for eye gaze. In this respect, 
an intriguing question concern the developmental origin of biological motion perception 
and the origin of the ability to use directional information of biological motion to guide 
attention. 
 
3.5 Detecting motion from complex arrays in the first year of life. 
From a developmental perspective, behavioral studies showed that 3-day-old 
newborns have a spontaneous preference for biological motion rather other types of 
motion, such as random motion and mechanical motion (Bardi et al., 2011; Bidet-Ildei 
et al., 2014; Simion et al., 2008). Using the preferential looking paradigm, these authors 
tested newborns spontaneous preference for biological motion depicted in complex 
arrays. The study by Simion and collaborators (2008) demonstrated that when newborns 
were presented with a PLD of a walking hen compared to a PLD where dots move in a 
random fashion, newborns preferred biomechanical motion kinematics pattern rather 
than the random one. In same vein, newborns preferred biomechanical motion rather 
than a mechanical movement defined as linear movement of each single dots along the 
vertical axis (Bardi et al., 2011). This evidence, taken together, seems support the 
hypothesis done by Troje and Johnson (Troje & Westhoff, 2006; Johnons, 2006), that 
since birth the sensitivity towards biological motion is only driven by the local 
information of biological motion. 
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Subsequently works, suggest that the sensitivity towards global level of 
information of biological motion, such as that the array of dots is organized as a body, 
emerges later during development.  
The first study that tested infants’ sensitivity for biological motion by using 
complex arrays of dots was done by Fox and McDaniel (1982). The authors tested 4- 
and 6-month-old infants’ visual preference for a biological motion compared to an array 
of elements moving in a random fashion and they used PLDs representing a walking 
human figure. Infants were presented to a PLD depicting a figure of a human walking 
they preferred biological motion both at 4 months of age and at 6 months of age. In a 
series of studies, Berthental and colleagues investigated infants’ ability to organize 
complex arrays of dots as a coherent figure. At 5 months of age, infants are able to 
discriminate PLD walker from the same stimulus with scramble spatial relationship 
(Berthental, Proffitt, & Cutting, 1984) or with perturbed local rigidity between joints 
(Berthental, Proffitt, & Kramer, 1987) suggesting the emergence of sensitivity toward 
global information level of biological motion. This evidence, supports the hypothesis 
done by Troje and colleagues that the second mechanism that would be responsible to 
recognize and identifying agents based on configural information, would not be innate 
but an experience-dependent mechanism that become functioning during the 
development. Moreover, the extraction of relevant social information would be 
supported by this mechanism (Chang & Troje 2009), and this information might be used 
to interpret other intentions and depositions and moreover they might be used for 
specific tasks such as orienting attention.  
In light of this, a study done by Kuhlmeier and colleagues (2010) demonstrated 
that at 6 months of age, infants are sensitive to PLDs orientation and they are able to 
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extract information of directionality from PLDs depicting human figure. Testing 6-
month-old infants with a habituation paradigm the authors demonstrated that infants are 
able to extract information of directionality only when the PLDs is presented upright 
and most intriguing when no actual translation is occurring. 
To summarize, in agreement with Troje, and according to Moore’s taxonomy 
(2012), perception of biological motion seems to develop gradually during the 
development; it starts from an initial sensitivity toward local cues of biomechanical 
motion and the sensitivity towards global level of information emerges around 5-6 
months of age for human motion. Moreover, at 6 months of age, when PLDs were 
presented upright infants are able to extract directionality information from human 
motion (Khulmeier, Troje, & Lee, 2010).  
An intriguing question that is still open, is that of discovering at which age level 
during infancy walking direction can trigger a visuo-spatial orienting of attention as it 
happens in adults.  
   
3.6 Biological motion and orienting of attention in infancy 
3.6.1 Behavioral and electrophysiological evidence 
Orienting of attention is a crucial mechanism that is functional since birth. It is 
supported by subcortical structures (i.e. the superior colliculus) (Simion et al., 1995), 
and it allows newborns to process potentially relevant information in the surrounding 
space. 
Research has started to be carried out in an attempt to investigate whether 
information of directionality conveyed by biological motion, may trigger visual-spatial 
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orienting in a way similar to what other directional social cues do in infancy (i.e., eye-
gaze, pointing and grasping gestures) (Bardi et al., 2015). 
Behavioral studies, demonstrated that social cues, as for example hand gesture, 
can trigger an orienting of attention also in infancy. Daum and Gredebäck (2011), tested 
infants of 3, 5 and 7 months of age employing a cueing paradigm with a static human 
hand (i.e. grasping action) or mechanical claw as cue. Findings demonstrated that 
infants have a cueing effect only from 5 months of age and only with the human hand. 
Specifically, infants showed faster saccade latencies for congruent rather than 
incongruent targets only when they were cued by human gesture. Authors suggest that 
the emergence of cueing effect from 5 months of age, might be consequence of the 
experience that infants from 5 months age have with their own hand gesture. Moreover, 
the absence of the cueing effect in younger infants might be due to the absence of a 
perceived translational movement. As shown in a previous study (Farroni, Johnson, 
Brockbank, & Simion 2000), the presence of movements seems to be necessary to elicit 
orienting of attention, as well as the cueing effect, in younger infants. Specifically, 
Farroni and colleagues (2000) tested 4-month-old infants with a cueing paradigm 
employing gaze as a cue. Results showed that infants have faster responses for 
congruent target rather than incongruent only when the movement of the eyes was 
perceived. In contrast, when the motion of the pupils was hidden by a blinking face, 
infants did not show any facilitation in orienting their attention. 
The first answer to the question of whether information of directionality 
conveyed by biological motion can trigger and orient visuo-spatial attention also in 
infants was done by my previous work (Bardi et al., 2015). In this study, we 
demonstrated that 6-month-old infants use the information of directionality conveyed by 
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human motion to orient their attention towards the spatial hemifield indicated by PLDs 
of a human walker. Starting from the behavioral evidence that infants are able to extract 
directionality from PLDs of human walker (Kuhlmeier et al., 2010), we tested infants 
with a cueing paradigm employing a central PLD of human motion walking on a 
treadmill followed by a peripheral target. This PLD cue stimulus could be presented 
upright or upside-down and it was facing either right or left. As for adults (see previous 
section), infants’ saccadic reaction times were faster in response to targets appearing at 
congruent rather than incongruent spatial positions when the cue was presented upright 
but not when it was presented upside-down. Therefore, this study demonstrated that the 
walking direction of a human motion PLD can trigger automatic visual-spatial orienting 
in 6-month-old infants and participants have faster saccadic reaction times when the 
target is presented at the spatial position cued by a PLD of a human walker. In light of 
this behavioral evidence, it seems that kinematic information of human motion, as well 
as motion performed by other stimuli that vehicle social information, is able, by itself, 
to trigger orienting of attention. 
Moreover, a series of studies (i.e. Gredebäck, Melinder & Daum, 2010; Senju, 
Johnson & Csibra, 2006; Richards, 2000; Xie & Richards 2017) have also used non-
invasive techniques (EEG/ERP) to investigate whether possible attention-related 
sensory gain effect to targets appearing at cued relative to uncued associated with this 
attentional priming effect occurring early in life. Richards (2000) demonstrated that 
infants are able to shift their attention towards the location indicated by an exogenous 
cue and the effect is indexed by specific ERP responses. Richard’s study revealed that 
infants oriented their attention overtly (i.e. gazing) towards the spatial position indicated 
by peripheral exogenous cues (i.e. flashes of light), showing shorter saccade latencies 
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for congruent rather than incongruent trials. Moreover, infants exhibited distinct ERP 
(e.g., P1, N1) responses to spatially cued stimuli compared to non-cued stimuli 
(Richards 2000, 2005). Specifically, the P1 component was found to be larger for 
congruent than incongruent trials across occipital electrodes in 4.5- and 6-month-old 
infants but no difference was found in 3-month-olds. Similar results were found for the 
N1 component, which is the negative deflection following P1 (Richards 2000, 2005). 
The modulation of these sensory components (e.g. P1, N1) reveals that infants orient 
their covert attention before their overt attention, thus showing that attention-related 
sensory gain effect to targets that appeared at cued relative to uncued spatial position is 
present at very early stages of development.  
Different results came from studies that used central endogenous cues. Several 
studies used social stimuli (i.e. faces, eye gaze pointing, hand gesture) in modified 
versions of the traditional cueing paradigm and, recording the EEG signal, the 
modulation of the ERP components varied as function of the variation of the paradigm 
and the nature of the stimulus used. A first result, using a cueing paradigm in which the 
initial presentation of the target stimulus in one of two possible spatial locations was 
followed by presentation of the cue (a pointing hand) with 6-month-old infants, showed 
that the temporo-parietal component P400 is sensitive to cue-target congruency 
relations, being higher in amplitude for incongruent relative to congruent conditions 
(Bakker, Daum, Handl & Gredebäck, 2014; Gredebäck et al., 2010). A second version 
of the cueing paradigm requires the initial presentation of a neutral, non-directional cue 
(a face looking neither right or left) followed by a target appearing either at a left or 
right spatial location. Disappearance of target stimulus is synchronously coupled with 
appearance of a directional cue (a face looking right or left). Studies carried out with 
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this paradigm have revealed that the temporo-parietal component N290 is sensitive to 
congruency relations starting from 9 months of age (Senju et al., 2006). Similar results 
were found in 6-month-old infants, using a cueing paradigm where the target 
presentation was preceded by a possible or impossible hand gesture (Natale et al., 
2017). Natale and colleagues found that the N290 component is modulated by the 
congruency relation between cue and target but only when the cue is a possible hand 
gesture. Taken together, the available evidence demonstrates that, starting from the first 
months of life, the infant brain can differentiate congruency from incongruency 
relations. In addition, these results seem to indicate that a functional advantage may be 
achieved by detection of social or non-social cues, which could facilitate processing of 
potentially relevant information. Of note, all these ERP studies made use of static 
images of social stimuli. 
An issue that still needs to be explored relates to the kinematics proprieties of 
motion that are crucial in triggering orienting of attention and the neural mechanisms 
underpinning this cueing effect elicited by biological motion. As suggested by 
behavioral evidences, motion seems to a have a central role to elicit orienting of 
attention in infancy (Farroni et al., 2000; Daum & Gredebäck, 2011; Bardi et al., 2015) 
Importantly, human motion is characterized by specific kinematic properties and all 
human actions (i.e. eye gaze, hand gesture, and walking) obey to specific rules resulting 
from the physical constraints of the human body (Moore, 2012). As demonstrated by 
Bardi and colleagues (2015) 6-month-old infants orienting of attention when PLDs 
human walker were used as cue. However, Bardi and colleagues (2015) recorded only 
overt responses, such as saccade latencies. Thus, this study does not clearly demonstrate 
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that the human motion induces an orienting of attention in the absence of eye 
movements.  
Even though, according to Rizzolatti and colleagues’ (1987) premotor theory of 
attention, the process of preparing the eyes to move is the mechanism by which 
endogenous spatial attention is engaged at target location before active stimulation, 
regardless of the nature, overt or covert, of the attentional shift, Bardi and colleagues’ 
results might be argued to be valid only for overt shifts of attention. In particular, they 
did not demonstrate the existence of sensory gain effects in response to targets 
appearing at cued relative to uncued locations when the cue is represented by biological 
motion walking direction. In order to answer this question, an EEG study is required. If 
human motion really triggers covert orienting of attention, by analyzing the ERPs, one 
should observe a specific modulation of the sensory components (P1 and N1) occurring 
before eye movements. 
Considering this evidence, the aim of the experiments described in the present 
chapter, was to investigate the neural correlates of the attentional effect accompanying 
mechanisms of visual-spatial orienting triggered by upright biological motion walking 
direction.  
According to Troje’s model (2006), that states that the subcortical system that is 
deputed to detection of directionality information is present since birth, it might be 
plausible to hypothesizes that even at 3 months of age infants can extract this 
information and use it to orient attention towards the peripheral space. However, to date 
no evidence is present in literature with infants younger than 6 months of age. For this 
reason, in the following experiments infants of 3 and 6 months of age were tested to 
describe a developmental trajectory of how our visual system use kinematic information 
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conveyed by biological motion to orient attention in surrounding space. To this end, the 
cueing paradigm used by Bardi and colleagues (2015) was adopted and coupled with the 
recording of EEG signal. As in the previous behavioral and EEG infants’ studies (i.e. 
Bardi et al., 2015; Farroni et al., 2000; Natale et al., 2017), in the following experiments 
only congruent and incongruent trials were presented. In the absence of neutral trials, 
facilitatory and inhibitory effects are confounded. Accordingly, the aim was to 
investigate the neural correlate of these attentional effect, regardless of whether they 
originate by the facilitation of cued trials, the inhibition of uncued trials or both.  
 
Experiment 7: 3month-old infants 
The aim of Experiment 7 is to test 3-month-old infants’ ability to extract 
walking direction from PLDs of human walker and to orient visuo-spatial attention 
toward the spatial position indicated by walking direction. Infants were tested with a 
cueing paradigm (Bardi et al., 2015; Natale et al., 2017), where a PLDs of human 
walker presented upright was employed as cue. The cue, could walk either toward the 
left or right direction, and was followed by a peripheral target that might appear in a 
congruent or incongruent spatial position with respect to the walking direction of the 
cue. Saccadic latencies were recorded coupled with ERP target locked to test: 1) the 
possibility that walking direction can trigger orienting of attention in 3-month-old 
infants; 2) the possible effect on sensory components (i.e. P1), of the orienting of 
attention triggered by walking information.  
Methods 
Participants 
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Eighteen healthy, full-term 3-month-old infants (10 females, mean age= 3 
months and 20 days, range= 90-140 days) participated in the study. One participant was 
discarded because starting crying during testing. For this reason, seventeen out of 18 
participants were considered for behavioral analysis. Eleven out of the 17 infants (7 
females), were considered for ERP target-locked analysis. The criterion adopted for the 
inclusion in the sample of the ERP analysis was: at least 10 trials in one of the two 
experimental condition (congruent vs. incongruent). The average of trials presented for 
both conditions were 11 for the congruent and 12 for the incongruent. Infants were 
tested if awake and in an alert state, and after parents gave their informed consent. The 
experimental protocol was approved by the Ethical Committee of the University of 
Padova (protocol number 1956). 
Stimuli 
Cue stimuli consisted of frame sequences of a walking human figure. The 
human walker, computed as the average walker from motion-captured data of 50 males 
and 50 females (Troje, 2002, 2008), was depicted by a set of 11 markers representing 
the main joints and the head of the person. The translating component of the walk was 
removed such that the human displayed stationary walking. All walkers were presented 
in profile, either facing leftward or rightward, and were shown with a gait frequency of 
0.76 Hz. All stimuli appeared as white dots on a black background and the full point 
light figure subtended a visual angle of 7.59°x 3.81°. The target stimulus consisted of a 
colorful ball and it subtended a visual angle of 1.43°x1.43° and the distance between the 
center of the cue and the center of the target was 12.68° (13.5 cm). At the beginning of 
each trial, to attract infants’ attention to the center of a screen, a series of silent 
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animated video (e.g. cartoons) was presented as attention getter. The attention getter 
lasted until the eye of the infants was aligned with the center of the screen. 
Apparatus and Procedure 
Testing took place in a dimly illuminated room. Infants were seated on a 
parent’s lap approximately 60 cm from screen (24 inches; resolution 1024 x 768 pixels) 
used for stimulus presentation. A two-machine solution was adopted for experimental 
control. The sequence and timing of stimulus presentation was controlled using a 
computer with E-Prime 2.0. This computer was interfaced with Net Station (Electrical 
Geodesic, Eugene, OR.) via a serial connection. Net Station was used to record the 
critical sequence of events along with the high-density EEG data. Infants’ eye blinks 
and saccades were monitored online by an experimenter via a visual inspection of the 
continuous EEG signal recorded. Additionally, a video camera situated above the screen 
used for stimulus presentation recorded the infants’ face and gaze behavior. 
A cueing paradigm was employed (Natale et al., 2017; Posner, 1980). As shown 
in Figure 1, each trial began with a visually animated but silent fixation point, (attention 
getter) randomly selected among 16 different animations, displayed at the center of the 
screen). As soon as the infant looked at it, this attention getter was replaced by the 
visual-spatial cue, namely a PLD of a human body walking toward the right or the left 
position. The cue was shown for 1200 ms and, after a variable delay (range: 300-500 
ms), the target stimulus was displayed for 200 ms at a peripheral spatial location (~10 
degrees of visual angle from the center of the screen) either congruent or incongruent 
with the cue walking direction (Figure 3.3).  
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Figure 3.3 Representation of the sequence of events in the cueing paradigm. Two 
types of trials were presented: Congruent and Incongruent trials. In congruent 
trials the target appeared in the spatial position cued by biological motion walking 
direction; in incongruent trials the target appeared in the spatial position not cued 
by biological motion walking direction. 
 
 Stimuli were presented in blocks of 16 trials, eight congruent (four with left-and 
four with right-sided targets) and eight incongruent (four with left-and four with right-
sided targets). The animated fixation point varied on each trial. Also the target stimulus 
varied, being randomly selected among four possible types. In order to obtain as many 
trials as possible from each infant, there was no restriction in number of blocks or trials 
shown: they were played as long as the infant was not fussy. Specifically, the 
experimental session was terminated when infants looked away from the screen during 
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five consecutive trials. On average, 35 trials, were presented to each infant, with no 
difference between number of valid (N=20) and invalid (N=23) trials, t(10)= , p=.09. 
Gaze behavior recording and coding 
Infants’ gaze behavior was scored with a computerized frame-by-frame 
observational coding system (40 ms resolution), enabling two independent coders to 
identify the exact time at which the infant’s pupil began moving horizontally, indicating 
gaze shift in the direction of the cue and toward/away from the target stimulus. 
Specifically, gaze shifts toward the target were coded to identify correct gaze behavior 
and to calculate the Saccadic Reaction Time (SRT: the elapsed time between the onset 
of the target and the onset of the infant’s gaze shift). To calculate inter-coders 
reliability, the second observer coded gaze behavior in a sample of eight participants. 
Pearson correlation revealed a high degree of agreement between the two coders, r = 
0.99, p < .0001. 
EEG recording and analysis 
Continuous scalp EEG was recorded from a 128-channel HydroCel Geodesic 
Sensor Net (Electrical Geodesic, Eugene, OR) that was connected to a NetAmps 300 
amplifier (Electrical Geodesic, Eugene, OR) and referenced on-line to a single vertex 
electrode (Cz). Electrical signal was recorded from 124 of the 128 channels on the nets 
as 4 electro-oculographic channels (that are typically positioned on the face) were 
removed to enhance infants’ tolerability of the net. Channel impedance was kept at or 
below 100 KΩ and signals were sampled at 500 Hz. EEG data were pre-processed off-
line using EEGLAB (Delorme & Makeig, 2004). As a first step, data segments were 
filtered using a 0.3–30 Hz band-pass filter and re-referenced to average reference.  The 
EEG signal was segmented to 350 ms post-stimulus onset, with a baseline period 
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beginning 100 ms prior to target onset and baseline corrected using mean voltage during 
the 100 ms pre-stimulus period. Automated artifact detection was applied to the 
segmented data to detect individual epoched that showed >200µV voltage changes 
within the segment period. Bad segments were marked when belonging to trials in 
which fast eye movements occurred, as assessed by off-line coding. Segments in which 
correct gaze shifts occurred were marked as bad if gaze shift started before the target 
off-set. Thus, segments with SRTs faster than 200 ms were marked as bad. Finally, we 
also marked as bad segments belonging to trials in which distractions occurred. Bad 
segments identified by either procedure were excluded from further analysis. A linear 
interpolation was conducted to correct for any rejected channels using the five closest 
electrodes.  
Since the design of paradigm (i.e. spatial visual cueing with peripheral target) 
require to infants to shift their eyes; saccades occurred during the task. To remove the 
effect of eye movements, an Independent Component Analysis (ICA) was done using 
the “extended runica” function in MATLAB. The analysis was performed on the EEG 
segmented data for each single participant. The 124 components were plotted based on 
the decreasing variance explained. All the components were visually inspected and were 
rejected those which have eye movement according to the 2D topographical plots. 
Specifically, those components that have a positive/negative distribution that suggest a 
frontal dipole, i.e. eye movement, and those components that have frontal and posterior 
opposite polarity, i.e. eye blink, were excluded.  
 For each participant, average waveforms were generated within each 
experimental condition (congruent and incongruent) only if at least 7 artifact-free trials 
collapsed across target side were overall available per condition.  
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Results 
Saccadic Reaction Times (SRTs) 
All Infants were considered for statistical analysis of behavioral data. On 
average, percentage of correct (i.e. saccade toward spatial side where target appeared) 
gaze shifts was 75% with no difference between congruent (39%) and incongruent 
(40%) trials; 20% of detected gaze shifts were identified as distractions (infants didn’t 
look at the monitor); finally, there were a few spatial errors (saccade toward the spatial 
position where the target didn’t appear) and anticipations/delays (saccade stared before 
target appearing), i.e. overall 5%. Consequently, a paired T-test between mean SRTs in 
congruent trials and mean SRTs in incongruent trials was carried out. Infants’ SRTs 
were not faster in response to congruent trials (M=376 ms, SD=87) relative to 
incongruent trials (M=394 ms, SD=101), t(16)=-1.252, p=.228 (Figure 3.4).  
 
Figure 3.4 Average of saccadic reaction time of Experiment 7 
 
Target-locked P1 ERP component  
Inspection of the grand-averaged waveforms revealed that the P1 ERP 
component was reliably elicited at target onset over occipito-parietal scalp sites. Based 
on visual inspection of both the grand-averaged and individual waveforms, 17 clusters 
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of electrodes were created for the ERP target-locked analysis. According to 10-10 
system of electrodes, clusters for O1, OZ, O2, I1, IZ, I2, PO7, PO8, PO9, PO10, P7, P8, 
P9, P10, TP7, TP8, CZ were created using the average of the three closest electrodes 
(Table 1). Based on grand-averaged data and individual data, peak and mean amplitude 
of P1 were extracted within a time window of 100 to 150 ms.  
Clusters of Electrodes Electrodes Number 
HGSN system 
O1 66 70 71 
OZ 71 75 76 
O2 76 83 84 
I1 69 73 74 
IZ 74 81 82 
I2 82 88 89 
PO7 59 65 66 
PO8 84 90 91 
PO9 64 65 68 
PO10 90 94 95 
P7 51 58 59 
P8 91 96 97 
P9 57 63 64 
P10 95 99 100 
TP7 46 50 51 
TP8 97 101 102 
CZ 7 31 55 80 106 
Table 1. On the left column, Cluster of electrodes created for ERP analysis in 
accordance with 10-10 system. On the right column, electrodes numbers selected 
from HGSN system to create clusters 
 
Figure 3.5 shows the overall ERP responses in occipital, parietal and parietal-
occipital cluster.  
A repeated measure ANOVA on the peak amplitude with Congruency 
(Congruent vs. Incongruent) and Electrodes as within subject factors was performed. 
This analysis did not reveal any significant main effect or interactions.  
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Figure 3.5 Grand Average plot in occipital and parietal clusters: response to 
congruent condition is represented in black, whereas response to incongruent 
condition is represented in grey 
 
Overall, results of Experiment 7 seem to suggest that at 3 months of life, infants 
are not able to extract information of directionality from a PLDs depicting a human 
walker. The absence of behavioral and neural effects it might due to the fact that the at 3 
months of age, infants have not yet sufficient experience with other motion to extract 
information of directionality.  
 
Experiment 8: 6-month-old infants 
The aim of Experiment 8 is to test 6-month-old infants’ ability to extract 
walking direction from PLDs of human walker. Infants underwent the same paradigm 
and the same condition employed in Experiment 7. 
Saccadic latencies were recorded coupled with ERP target locked to test: 1) the 
possibility that walking direction can trigger orienting of attention in 6-month-old 
infants; 2) the possible effect on sensory components (i.e. P1), of the orienting of 
attention triggered by walking information.  
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From a behavioral perspective, we predicted to observe a modulation of infants’ 
oculomotor behavior as a function of congruency/incongruency relations between the 
walking direction of the upright walker and the appearance of a peripheral target 
stimulus. From a neural point of view, if human motion orients visuo-spatial attention, 
we predicted to observe a modulation of the sensory ERP components (i.e. P1 and N1). 
Accordingly, we hypothesized these early ERP components to exhibit higher amplitude 
in response to targets appearing at congruent relative to incongruent spatial locations. 
In addition, I predicted that the modulation of sensory components should 
originate from brain areas involved in visual processing. Therefore, besides analyzing 
the ERP component, I applied cortical source analysis to examine the brain regions that 
might generate the recorded ERPs involved in infants orienting of attention (Richards, 
2005, Xie & Richards 2017). These studies have suggested the cortical regions 
generating the P1 validity effect could be located in contralateral Brodmann’areas 18 
and 19 (Richards 2005) and in the contralateral ventral temporal areas (Xie & Richards 
2017). Cortical sources for N1 validity effect were instead localized in BAs 7, 18, 19 
(Richards 2005), the contralateral inferior and middle occipital regions and middle and 
superior temporal regions (Xie & Richards 2017).  
Methods 
Participants 
Twenty-four healthy, full-term 6-month-old infants (10 females, mean age=6 
months and 7 days, range=183-224 days) participated in the study. All of them were 
considered for behavioral analysis. Eleven out of the 24 infants (7 females, mean age=6 
months and 7 days, range=183-205 days) were considered for ERP target-locked 
analysis. The criterion adopted for the inclusion in the sample of the ERP analysis was: 
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at least 10 trials in one of the two experimental condition (congruent vs. incongruent). 
The average of trials presented for both conditions were 11 for the congruent and 12 for 
the incongruent. Five additional infants were tested, but not included in the final sample 
of participants because of fussiness or excessive movement artifacts, resulting in no 
reliable performance. Infants were tested if awake and in an alert state, and after parents 
gave their informed consent. The experimental protocol was approved by the Ethical 
Committee of the University of Padova (protocol number 1956). 
Stimuli 
Stimuli were the same employed in Experiment 7. 
Apparatus and Procedure 
Apparatus and procedure were the same employed in Experiment 7. 
Gaze behavior recording and coding 
Gaze behavior was recorded and coded with the same setting of Experiment 7. 
The agreement between coders was r = 0.99, p < .0001. 
EEG recording and analysis 
EEG system was the same used in Experiment 7 and the ERP analysis was 
conducted following the same pipeline of Experiment 7. 
 
Cortical Source Localization 
The Cortical Source analysis was performed using Fieldtrip toolbox 
(Oostenveld, Fries, Maris, Schoffelen, 2011) and in-house custom MATLAB scripts. 
The analysis was performed following four major steps: 1) selection of anatomical 
MRIs; 2) construction of realistic head models: 3) definition of regions of interests 
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(ROIs); 4) source reconstruction (i.e., current density reconstruction; CDR) (for details, 
see Xie and Richards, 2017).  
The selection of the MRI was done from the Neurodevelopment MRI Database 
(Richards and Xie, 2015) by selecting the MRI average template for 6-month-old 
participants. The infant MRIs were segmented into: scalp, skull, cerebral spinal fluid, 
white matter, gray matter, nasal cavity and eyes (Richards, 2013). 
Twenty-three brain regions were chosen for ROI analysis based on past 
identification of dipoles responsible for generating scalp measurements (e.g., P1) in 
infant studies (i.e. Xie & Richards, 2017). These ROIs included the separate left and 
right volumes for the anterior fusiform gyrus, middle fusiform gyrus, medial inferior 
occipital lobe, lateral inferior occipital lobe, middle occipital lobe, superior occipital, 
parahippocampal gyrus, posterior inferior temporal gyrus, posterior middle-superior 
temporal gyri, and temporal pole (20 ROIs). A single bilateral ROI was used for the 
lingual gyrus, central occipital lobe, and parietal lobe (3 ROIs). 
The ERP data surrounding the P1 peaks was used to estimate the current density 
amplitudes (i.e., CDR values) for every location in the source volume model. The CDR 
values were then summed over each source location in a ROI and divided by the total 
volume of the ROI. For statistical analysis, the CDR value was averaged with the time 
window (±10 ms) around the P1 peak.  
Results 
Saccadic Reaction Times (SRTs) 
Infants included in the ERP target-locked analysis (N=11) were considered for 
statistical analysis of behavioral data. On average, percentage of correct (i.e. saccade 
toward spatial side where target appeared) gaze shifts was 70% (range = 60-80) with no 
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difference between congruent (39%) and incongruent (40%) trials, t(10)=-1.5, p=.19; 
18% of detected gaze shifts were identified as distractions (infants didn’t look at the 
monitor); finally, there were a few spatial errors (saccade toward the spatial position 
where the target didn’t appear) and anticipations/delays (saccade stared before target 
appearing), i.e. overall 3.2%. Consequently, a paired T-test between mean SRTs in 
congruent trials and mean SRTs in incongruent trials was carried out. Infants’ SRTs 
were faster in response to congruent trials (M=285.7 ms, SD=23.5) relative to 
incongruent trials (M=313.9 ms, SD=32.2), t(10)=2.48, p=.004. Analogous 
investigation was carried out for the entire sample of infants tested (N=24).  On 
average, percentage of correct gaze shifts was 75.4% (range=54-90%), with no 
difference between congruent (36.7%) and incongruent (38.7%) trials, t(21) =-1.5, p 
=.13. 21% of detected gaze shifts were identified as distractions; 3.2% were identified 
as spatial errors. A paired T-test was carried out between mean SRTs in congruent and 
incongruent trials. Infants were faster to orient their gaze in congruent trials (M=281 
ms, SD=24,5) rather than in incongruent trials (M=317ms, SD=30,4), t(21)= -3.482 
p=.002 (Figure 3.6). 
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Figure 3.6 Saccadic reaction times. On the left behavioral data from all 
participants tested; on the right behavioral data for the sub-sample included in 
ERPs analysis. * p <.05 
 
Target-locked P1 ERP component  
Inspection of the grand-averaged waveforms revealed that the P1 ERP 
component was reliably elicited at target onset over occipito-parietal scalp sites. Based 
on visual inspection of both the grand-averaged and individual waveforms, 17 clusters 
of electrodes were created for the ERP target-locked analysis. According to 10-10 
system of electrodes, clusters for O1, OZ, O2, I1, IZ, I2, PO7, PO8, PO9, PO10, P7, P8, 
P9, P10, TP7, TP8, CZ were created using the average of the three closest electrodes 
(Table 1). Based on grand-averaged data and individual data, peak and mean amplitude 
of P1 were extracted within a time window of 100 to 150 ms.  
Figure 3.6 shows the overall ERP responses in occipital, parietal and parietal-
occipital cluster. Peak of P1 component approximately occurs after 100-150 ms of 
target onset. P1 component was larger for congruent condition in the contralateral 
clusters. 
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 Figure 3.7 shows the topographical activation on the scalp in both condition. In 
both condition, is present a distribution (positive in the back and negative in the frontal 
areas) at P1 component that might suggest the presence of a source dipole that generates 
this ERPs component. However, starting from 50 ms after target onset the activation is 
greater in the congruent than in incongruent condition.  
A repeated measure ANOVA on the peak amplitude with Congruency 
(Congruent vs. Incongruent) and Electrodes as within subject factors was performed. 
This analysis revealed a main effect of Congruency, F(1,10)= 4.63, p=.057, η2p=.31. 
Overall the amplitude of P1 component, was larger for congruent (4.94 µV) than 
incongruent trials (3.46 µV).  
     Consequently, a paired T-test was separately carried out on peak and mean 
amplitude, for each cluster, between congruent and incongruent trials. The analyses 
revealed a significant effect as a function of congruency in PO10 and P10 clusters. 
Specifically, P1 component, was larger for congruent (6.39 µV) than incongruent trials 
(1.93 µV) in PO10, t(10)=.3.303 p=.008 and in P10 t(10)= 2.707, p=.022 (congruent 
trials = 3.48 µV, incongruent trials = - 0.86 µV). No significant effects were found on 
the mean amplitude.  
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Figure 3.6 Grand Average plot in occipital and parietal clusters: response to 
congruent condition is represented in black, whereas response to incongruent 
condition is represented in grey  
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Figure 3.7 Grand Average topoplot. Time labels indicate milliseconds after target 
stimulus onset. Response to congruent condition is represented in the upper part, 
whereas response to incongruent condition is represented in the lower part  
 
Cortical Analysis  
Cortical source analysis focused on the mean current density reconstruction 
amplitude (CDR value) in the ROIs that are potential cortical sources of the P1.  The 
first step of the analysis pipeline was conducted to determine the effect of cue-target 
congruency on CDR value around the P1 ERP peak latency (140 ms) in the ROIs. The 
ERP analysis showed a P1 validity effect in the PO10 and P10 clusters.  The CDR 
values were therefore tested as a ‘‘congruency effect’’ with congruent versus 
incongruent trials for each ROI segment. Two different ROIs had a significant 
congruency effect: parahippocampal gyrus and the anterior fusiform gyrus. Both this 
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ROIs are contralateral to the target position. This result, found in the aforementioned 
areas might reflect the facilitation in processing visual information when are cued by a 
previous stimulus. However, no congruency effect was found in the inferior occipital 
lobe and in lateral and medial occipital lobe. Figure 3.8 shows the CDR values during 
the time period surrounding the P1 peak (+48 ms/ -48ms) for valid and invalid condition 
in the two ROI that showed a significant effect. The congruent condition had larger 
CDR values (dotted blue line) starting from 16 ms before the P1 peak. Approximately 
around 30 ms after the P1 peak, the difference between two conditions is greater. Figure 
3.9 shows the bar graph of the CDR values for the two conditions in the two ROI that 
showed a significant effect. Average CDR values is greater in congruent than in 
incongruent condition. More specifically, the error bars (i.e. the standard errors of the 
means) did not overlap, suggesting a significant difference between condition. 
Figure 3.10 shows the brain areas involved as cortical sources of the P1 
component. The 2D images depicted in panel a), b), c); show the difference between 
congruent and incongruent condition. Figure 7, panel d) is 3D plot that depicted the 
difference between congruent and incongruent conditions in the brain areas that show a 
significant effect and are mainly involved to originate the P1 ERP component. 
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Figure 3.8 Line figures of CDR value from -48 ms to 48 ms around the P1 peak 
latency. Anterior fusiform gyrus and parahippocampal gyrus are the two ROis 
that show significant congruency effect. Both thiese areas are contralateral to 
target position. 
 
 
Figure 3.9 Bar graph of the CDR value in the two areas that show a congruency 
effect. 
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Figure 3.10 2D and 3D maps of the Congruency effect (i.e. activation for congruent 
condition – activation for the incongruent condition) surrounding the P1 peak in 
brain source. Panel a, b, c, are 2D coronal, sagittal and axial plots. Panel d), is the 
3D plot of the brain areas mainly involved to originate P1 congruency effect. All 
these data are plotted in an average 6-months-old brain template. 
 
Overall, results of Experiment 8 suggest that 6-month-old infants are able to 
extract walking direction from o PLD stimulus. Specifically, they showed faster 
saccadic reaction time for congruent rather than incongruent trials. ERPs evidence, 
demonstrate that the attentional effect occurs in the initial stages of visual processing. 
Specifically, target-locked ERP analysis demonstrated the existence of an attentional 
effect indexed by a greater P1 amplitude in response to congruent rather than 
incongruent trials. Brain source analysis revealed that the congruency effect found in 
the P1 is generated by visual areas such as parahippocampal gyrus and the anterior 
fusiform gyrus. 
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Experiment 9: Adults 
The aim of Experiment 9 was to test a control group of adults, results obtained 
recording manual reaction times replicated those previously obtained with saccadic 
latencies (Bardi et al 2015) and confirm that in adults walking direction could trigger 
orienting of visuo-spatial attention. In this experiment, ERP target locked component. 
were also recorded. Adults were tested with a cueing paradigm, the cue was a PLD of a 
human walker that was not predictive of the spatial position where the target would be 
appeared. 
Participants 
Fourteen undergraduate students selected from the Department of Psychology at 
the University of Padova took part at the experiment. One participant was discarded 
from the final sample because he decided to interrupt the testing session. Therefore, the 
final sample consisted of 13 undergraduate students (8 females; mean age = 24 years, 
SD= 1.12, range 22-26 years). All participants had no previous experience with eye 
movement studies and were naive to the experimental conditions and hypotheses of the 
study. All of them had normal or corrected-to-normal vision. The Ethical Committee of 
the Department of Developmental and Social Psychology of the University of Padova 
approved all the experimental procedures (Protocol number: 1956). 
Stimuli 
Cue stimulus was the same employed in Experiment 7 and 8. The target stimulus 
consisted of a white diamond and it was presented for 200 ms. At the beginning of each 
trial a fixation cross was presented in the center of a screen for 500 ms.  
Apparatus and Procedure 
The apparatus was the same employed in Experiment 7 and 8.  
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A cueing paradigm was employed (Posner, 1980; Bardi et al., 2015). The cue 
was shown for 1200 ms and, after a variable interval (range: 300-500 ms), the target 
stimulus was displayed for 200 ms at a peripheral spatial location (~10 degrees of visual 
angle from the center of the screen) either congruent or incongruent with the cue 
walking direction. Overall, 416 trials were presented and were equally divided between 
the experimental conditions (congruent and incongruent). 
Written instructions were given to all participants. Subjects were required to 
press as fast and accurately as possible the left arrow on the keyboard when the target 
was presented on the left side and the right arrow on the keyboard when the target was 
presented on the right side, by using the index finger of the left and right hand 
respectively (i.e., choice detection task). Participants’ manual Reaction Times (RTs) 
were recorded within a blank interval of 800 ms following the disappearance of the 
target stimulus. Participants were also instructed to not move the eyes and blink during 
the entire duration of each trial.  
EEG recording and analysis 
Continuous scalp EEG was recorded from a 128-channel HydroCel Geodesic 
Sensor Net (Electrical Geodesic, Eugene, OR) that was connected to a NetAmps 300 
amplifier (Electrical Geodesic, Eugene, OR) and referenced on-line to a single vertex 
electrode (Cz). Channel impedance was kept at or below 100 KΩ and signals were 
sampled at 500 Hz. EEG data were pre-processed off-line using EEGLAB (Delorme & 
Makeig, 2004). As a first step, data segments were filtered using a 0.3–30 Hz band-pass 
filter and re-referenced to average reference.  The EEG signal was segmented to 350 ms 
post-stimulus onset, with a baseline period beginning 100 ms prior to target onset and 
baseline corrected using mean voltage during the 100 ms pre-stimulus period. 
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Automated artifact detection was applied to the segmented data to detect individual 
epoched that showed >200µV voltage changes within the segment period. 
For each participant, average waveforms were generated within each 
experimental condition (congruent and incongruent). 
Results 
Manual reaction times (RTs) 
A paired T-test between mean RTs in congruent trials and mean RTs in 
incongruent trials was carried out. Adults’ RTs were faster in response to congruent 
trials (M=262.3ms, SD=49.6) relative to incongruent trials (M=275 ms, SD=56.5), 
t(12)=-2.82, p=.014 (3.11). 
 
 
Figure 3.11 Average of saccadic reaction time of Experiment 9 
 
Subsequently a repeated measure ANOVA with Age (3 months vs. 6 months vs. 
adults) as between participants factor and Congruency (congruent vs. incongruent) on 
reaction times recorded in Experiment 7, 8 and 9, was performed. The analysis revealed 
a main effect of the Age, F(1,2)= 1.27, p < .001, η2p=.049. Overall, with the increasing 
of the age, reaction time become faster (3 months M = 385.43, SE = 15.45; 6 months M 
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= 299.50, SE = 13.58 Adults M = 268.7, SE = 17.66). Was also found a main effect of 
Congruency, F(1,49) = 11.130, p < .002, η2p=.185, suggesting that reaction time was 
faster for congruent trials (M = 306.77, SE = 8.32) rather than incongruent (M =328.98, 
SE = 10.78). The interaction Age X Congruency did not reach the significance. The 
absence of interaction it might be due to the fact that in all samples a tendency to show 
faster reaction time for congruent rather than incongruent trials is present.  
 
Target-locked P1 ERP component  
Inspection of the grand-averaged waveforms revealed that the P1 ERP 
component was reliably elicited at target onset over occipito-parietal scalp sites. Based 
on visual inspection of both the grand-averaged and individual waveforms, 17 clusters 
of electrodes were created for the ERP target-locked analysis. According to 10-10 
system of electrodes, clusters for O1, OZ, O2, I1, IZ, I2, PO7, PO8, PO9, PO10, P7, P8, 
P9, P10, TP7, TP8, CZ were created using the average of the three closest electrodes 
(Table 1). Based on grand-averaged data and individual data, peak and mean amplitude 
of P1 were extracted within a time window of 130 to 180 ms.  
A paired T-test was separately carried out on peak and mean amplitude, for each 
cluster, between congruent and incongruent trials. The analyses revealed a significant 
effect as a function of congruency in temporo-parietal-occipital clusters. Specifically, 
P1 component, was larger for congruent (.65 µV) than incongruent trials (.38 µV) in 
TP8, t(12)=2.210 p=.047, in P10 t(12)= 2.221, p=.046 (congruent trials = 1.13 µV, 
incongruent trials = .59 µV), in P8 t(12)= 2.603, p=.023 (congruent trials = 1.02 µV, 
incongruent trials = .55 µV), and in PO10 t(12)= 2.645, p=.021 (congruent trials = 1.2 
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µV, incongruent trials = .48 µV). No significant effects were found on the mean 
amplitude (Figure 3.12).  
 
Figure 3.12 Grand Average plot in occipital and parietal clusters: response to 
congruent condition is represented in black, whereas response to incongruent 
condition is represented in grey  
 
Overall, results of Experiment 9 confirm that walking direction triggers 
orienting of attention in adults’ participant demonstrating that adults are faster to detect 
a peripheral target when it was presented in the spatial position congruent with walking 
direction rather than incongruent. ERPs evidence demonstrates that P1 target-locked 
component is modulated by the congruency relation between target and cue. Moreover, 
this effect is located in the contralateral clusters respect the side of targets’ appearance, 
as also shown in 6-month-old infants (Experiment 8). 
 
Conclusions 
The goal of the experiments described in the present chapter, was to investigate 
the neural correlates of the attentional effect accompanying mechanisms of visual-
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spatial orienting triggered by upright biological motion walking direction. In addition, 
infants of 3 and 6 months of age were tested to describe a developmental trajectory of 
how our visual system use kinematic information conveyed by biological motion to 
orient attention in surrounding space. 
To this aim 3- 6-month-old infants, were tested using a spatial cueing paradigm 
and EEG were recorded. Participants were presented with a spatially non-predictive 
PLDs of a human walker, followed by a peripheral target. Behavioral and ERPs data 
were analyzed as a function of the congruency relation between cue and target.  As in 
the previous behavioral and EEG studies (i.e. Bardi et al., 2015; Farroni et al., 2000; 
Natale et al., 2016; Schuller e Rossion, 2001), in the present experiment only congruent 
and incongruent trials were presented. It is true that the absence of neutral trials renders 
it impossible to differentiate facilitatory effects produced by congruent trials from 
inhibitory effects produced by incongruent trials. For this reason, all the comparisons 
were carried out between congruent and incongruent trials. That means that I must 
confine myself to dealing of “attentional effects” in general, without distinguishing 
between facilitation and inhibition.  
Overall, results of the three experiments demonstrate that the ability to extract walking 
direction from PLDs depicting a human walker seem to emerge at 6 months of age. This 
result confirms the previous behavioral findings that demonstrate that only at 6 months 
of age, infants were able to discriminate walking direction of human walker (Kuhlmeier 
et al., 2007). Moreover, ERPs results demonstrate that both adults and 6-month-old 
infants have a modulation of sensory component to the target as a function of the 
congruency relation with the cue. 
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Specifically, Experiment 7 demonstrated that 3-month-old infants seem not to be 
able to extract walking direction from PLDs depicting human walker. Behavioral results 
did not show any effect, that means that infants were not faster to orient their attention 
in congruent rather than incongruent trials. Also, ERP data did not reveal any 
modulation of P1 component related to congruency. The absence of effects both 
behavioral and in ERPs, might be interpreted as due to the fact that at 3 months of age 
infants are not still able to extract directionality information from a PLDs. These results 
are in line with previous behavioral evidence. Specifically, Berthental and colleagues 
(1985), demonstrated that infants starting from 5 months of age become sensitive 
toward the phase of dots. Phase of dots, is the spatio-temporal relation that characterized 
human motion. Walking direction, when a PLDs is presented walking on treadmill, is 
conveyed only from the phase of dots. Moreover, the absence of any modulation of 
attention triggered by biological motion walking direction can give rise to two possible 
interpretations. The first one might suggest that 3-months of age infants are not able to 
extract information of directionality from PLDs of a human walker. A second possible 
interpretation is that infants are able to extract the direction but they might not be able 
to use this information to orient their attention towards the surrounding space. 
Additionally, the absence of any effects also in ERPs components might depend on the 
fact that the system is too immature to show a modulation related to attentional 
mechanism in sensory components. As demonstrated by Richards (2000), by employing 
exogenous cues, the modulation of P1 components, due to the cue-target congruency 
relation, seems to emerge starting from 4.5 months of age.  
Whilst the Experiment 7 did not show any effect, Experiment 8 showed that at 6 
months of age infants are able to extract walking direction from a PLD and moreover, 
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this information of directionality triggers an orienting of attention. Behavioral results of 
Experiment 8 replicated eye-tracking evidence coming from Bardi and colleagues 
(2015), confirming the role of upright biological motion walking direction in triggering 
visual-spatial orienting. More specifically, data on infants’ behavior indicate that 
upright walking direction can facilitate saccade latencies in response to peripherally 
presented targets appearing at congruent relative to incongruent spatial locations. This 
advantage in saccade latencies might be explained by hypothesizing that the PLD 
walker triggers covert orienting of attention towards walking direction, yielding a 
facilitation of oculomotor responses to stimuli appearing at the attended location 
(Posner, 1980). Accordingly, behavioral results from this experiment confirm the 
hypothesis that upright biological motion walking direction of a human figure can 
influence mechanisms of visual-spatial orienting eliciting an overt orienting of attention.  
In addition, the electrophysiological evidence of Experiment 8, showed that this 
processing advantage precedes the oculomotor responses even when the cue is not 
exogenous (i.e. a flash of light). From an ERPs perspective, the results of Experiment 8 
support behavioral data, and demonstrate that the attentional effect occurs in the initial 
stages of visual processing. Specifically, target-locked ERP analysis demonstrated the 
existence of an attentional effect indexed by a greater P1 amplitude in response to 
congruent rather than incongruent trials. The P1 attentional effect indicates that the 
information provided by upright biological motion walking direction can yield a gain 
control or selective amplification of the sensory information in the extra-cortical visual 
pathways, improving the signal-to-noise ratio so that more information is extracted from 
relevant portions of the visual field. Importantly, the modulation of P1 component 
related to congruency obtained in this experiment by employing a central cue converges 
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with evidence from developmental studies investigating the ERP correlates of covert 
shifts of attention triggered by pure exogenous cues in infants from 4 to 6 months 
(peripheral flashes of light) (Richards, 2000, 2005). These studies have reported an 
analogous enhancement of the P1 component for congruent relative to incongruent trials 
in the absence of overt shifts of fixation. As in these studies, also in Experiment 8 
infants’ fixation remained at central location until the target was presented.  
Additionally, results coming from cortical source analysis show that infants manifest a 
facilitation effect and that the brain areas involved in the P1 congruency effect were 
parahippocampal gyrus and the anterior fusiform gyrus. The brain areas involved are 
visual areas: these data demonstrate that the facilitation effect has direct consequences 
on visual processing. The brain areas that are involved in the P1 congruency effect 
found in this study are located in parahippocampal gyrus and in the anterior fusiform 
gyrus and differ from those found in previous studies (Richards 200; Xie & Richards 
2016). One possible interpretation between the results of Experiment 8 and those 
obtained in Richards’ studies might be based on the different nature of the cues. 
Whereas in the study by Richards (2005) an exogenous cue was used, in the present 
study a central salient cue was used. The comparison between the two experiments, 
seem to suggest that when the ERPs at the scalp level converge, the nature of the cue 
stimuli affect the brain areas that origin the ERPs component. In accordance with the 
adult literature, social stimuli (i.e. eye gaze) seem to activate different brain areas 
compared to non-social stimuli (i.e. arrows) when they act as a cue in spatial cueing 
paradigms. For example, Hietanen and colleagues (2006), demonstrated that eye gaze 
activates a more specific area (e.g. temporal and parietal areas, i.e. STS) rather than 
arrows, which activate instead broader brain areas.  Additionally, evidence has indicated 
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that biological motion information is processed in the superior temporal sulcus (STS, 
Shiffrar, 1994).  
Overall, behavioral and neural evidence coming from Experiment 8 converge in 
indicating that upright biological motion PLDs walking direction triggers automatic 
visual-spatial orienting in 6-month-old infants and that effects in oculomotor behavior 
are associated with functionally significant brain effects.  
Finally, Experiment 9 demonstrate that also in adults walking direction can 
trigger a visuo-spatial orienting of attention. Behavioral findings confirm and extend the 
results found in Bardi and colleagues’ study (2015) demonstrating that also with manual 
reaction times, adults were faster to detect congruent rather than incongruent targets. 
Intriguing, ERPs evidence demonstrate that also biological motion, as well as other 
social cues such as gaze, can orient attention toward the peripheral space, showing a 
modulation of P1 sensory component as a function of congruent relation between cue 
and target. Moreover, the effect in adults is localized in the temporo-parietal-occipital 
clusters. Adults’ areas at the scalp level, are the same areas that become active in 6-
month-old infants; this is might be an interesting starting point for localizing brain 
sources of P1 components either in adults. 
Taken together, evidence described in this Chapter suggests that the ability to 
use walking direction to orient attention towards the peripheral space is an ability that 
emerges from 6 months of age. Specifically, 6-month-olds extract directionality and use 
it to orient attention towards the surrounding space whereas 3-month-olds infants do not 
utilize this cue. Unfortunately, I can not answer the question of whether or not they are 
able to extract directionality from the motion of dots. What I can argued is that the lack 
of congruency effect in 3-month-old infants resemble data obtained with eye gaze 
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studies with 4-month-old infants3 that orient attention in the congruent location only on 
condition to perceive the translational movements of the eyes (Farroni, et al., 2000).  
From a Neo/Neuro-constructivist perspective, the comparison between 3- and 6-
month-old infants suggests that the ability to use information, such as directionality, to 
orient attention is an ability that emerges gradually during the development. A possible 
tentative explanation of the data might suggest that with increase of visual experience, 
due to the bidirectional interaction of these biases and the statistical regularities present 
in the specie-specific environment qualitative changes occur and at 6 months of age 
infants become able to use information of directionality to orient attention towards the 
peripheral space.  
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General Discussion 
 
A central issue in developmental cognitive science is to understand how 
cognition develops and changes over time to reach an adult level of specialization. 
Determining the abilities with which infants come equipped into the world, their 
mechanisms for acquiring knowledge, and whether and how these abilities change as a 
function of development and experience is a challenging issue. 
Since humans are intensely social creatures and they tend to rely on visual 
signals for communicating psychological dispositions, intentions and emotions, the 
study of how our system become specialized to detect and recognize others is an 
interesting field of research. A fundamental human social ability is the capacity to 
accurately detect and understand the intentional conduct of others, to anticipate their 
upcoming actions, and to appropriately adjust their own behavior (Gallese, 2009). 
Particularly, face and body motion represent primary social cues and it has been 
demonstrated that adults’ brain has a specific neural network that supports detection and 
recognition of conspecifics and their actions (Adolphs, 2009). 
From an ontogenetic perspective, the ability to read behavioral cues may be 
regarded as the fundamental precursors of more sophisticated social cognitive abilities 
(Gallese, 2009). Indeed, there is no doubt that before attributing goals, desires, 
dispositions to social agents, humans need to detect them in the environment and they 
need to use perceptual cues that allow them to discriminate animate versus inanimate 
objects. One of the most powerful cues that attract attention since birth is motion. 
Moreover, motion of living being has specific features that are not shared with motion 
of inanimate objects, such as self-propulsion and speed changes.  
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Considering motion as a fundamental feature that human species might use to 
detect others and within Neo/Neuro-constructivist theoretical framework, the purpose of 
my PhD dissertation was to test the role of kinematics in detection of social agents.  
Particularly, my hypothesis that our visual system, since birth, possesses some 
attentional biases towards specific cues of motion that characterize animate entities 
seems to be confirmed by the data. In my view, these low-level biases are the building 
blocks, on which during development, infants and adults built their ability to infer other 
intentions. In this vein, the presence of the ability to orient attention on the basis of 
walking direction in 6-month-old infants and the absence of this effect in 3-month-old 
infants document that the experience during the first months of life plays a central role 
in shaping how our specie can use kinematics information, and also in shaping the 
system to become specialized in processing social information.  
Using both the visual preference and the visual habituation techniques, the aim 
of the experiments presented in Chapter 2 was to investigate which are the perceptual 
motion cues towards which our visual system is sensitive since birth. According to 
evidence showing that both human infants, adults and even newly hatched chicks 
(Mascalzoni et al., 2010) seem to use self-propelled, change in direction, and speed 
changes motion cues to discriminate between animate and inanimate entities (Tremoulet 
and Feldman, 2000; Lou and Baillargeron 2010), collected data demonstrate that at birth 
also human newborns are sensitive self-propelled motion cues (Experiment 1; 
Experiment 2). Furthermore, results obtained from Experiment 3, 4, 5, and 6, 
demonstrate that also newborns are sensitive to speed change motion cues. Specifically, 
results of the experiments that tested newborns’ preference for speed changes 
demonstrated that newborns are not sensitive to speed changes in general but their 
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attention is specifically attracted by the combination of acceleration and deceleration 
and only when these cues of motion follow a specific order of presentation. Newborns 
seem to have an innate predisposition towards acceleration-deceleration pattern of 
kinematics (Experiment 5), and they do not have a bias towards single speed changes 
(Experiment 3, and 4) or in a condition where the order of presentation was inverted 
(Experiment 6).  
Data presented in Chapter 2 support the view that several vertebrate species, 
including humans, have a primitive bias toward detecting social agents and attending to 
and preferentially processing sensory information about other living entities (Carey, 
2009) such as motion. Additionally, these results support the idea that animacy 
perception might be considered as a result of some low-level processes of the visual 
system (Rutherford, 2013). Newborns’ sensitivity to detect visual cues of motion that 
belongs to animate and not to inanimate entities, does not imply that newborns have 
abstract concepts of animacy or agency (Carey, 2009).  
The evidence found in the experiments described in Chapter 2, suggests that 
human species, since birth, have attentional biases that are pre-wired to detect cues of 
motion that belong to animate entities, such as self-propulsion and acceleration-
deceleration pattern of motion. The sensitivity to perceptual cues of motion might be a 
sort of starting point to the development of the adults and infants’ ability to extract 
social information from motion. In accordance with Carey (Carey, 2009) and Leslie 
(1994; Birò & Leslie 2007) the sensitivity towards perceptual cues of motion, that 
trigger animacy perception in adults, might be the bases on which during development, 
infants built the abstract concepts of intentional agency and mentalistic agency and also 
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the bases on which humans build their ability to attribute attitudes and intention to 
others (mentalizing).  
Taken together the evidence discussed in Chapter 2 supports the Neo/Neuro-
constructivist assumption that states that at birth infants are equipped with constraints 
(i.e. attentional biases) that allow the system to have benefits such as focusing the 
cognitive system towards certain aspects of the environment or facilitating processing of 
certain types of inputs (Karmiloff-Smith, 1992). Specifically, the inborn sensitivity 
towards cues of motion such as self-propulsion and Acceleration Deceleration pattern of 
motion allows the system to focus attention towards these specific cues also when they 
are embedded in complex arrays.  
Previous evidence demonstrates newborns and infants manifest a sensitivity 
toward these motion cues (i.e. Simion et al., 2008; Bardi et al., 2011) also when they are 
embedded in a complex array of dots. Moreover, evidence collected with adults 
demonstrates that when the complex array of dots depicts a walking human figure, 
adults can retrieve multiple social information form it such as walking direction (Bardi, 
et al., 2015). According to Troje and Johnson (Troje e Westhoff, 2006; Johnson, 2006), 
humans, as well other vertebrates, have an inborn mechanism that allow the system to 
detect other vertebrates based on motion. This mechanism, namely Perceptual Life 
Detector, would be an ontogenetically innate mechanism supported by subcortical 
structure. This mechanism would be deputed to be sensitive to the motion of legged 
vertebrate appearing in the visual periphery and to walking direction (Jonhson, 2006). 
Indeed, the oscillating movement of dots representing feet, is the best motion cues to 
detect and discriminate the direction of motion of vertebrate animals.  
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According to this model and in light of the evidence found in the experiments 
described in Chapter 2, the aim of the experiments described in Chapter 3 was to test 
whether the information of directionality conveyed by a complex array of dots, such as 
a PLD depicting a walking human figure, and conveyed by cues of motion such as self-
propulsion and AD pattern of motion, can trigger orienting of attention in infancy. In 
Experiment 7 and 8 two samples of infants at different age levels were tested (i.e. 3- and 
6-month-old infants) by using a visuo-spatial cueing paradigm (Posner, 1980; Bardi, et 
al., 2015) with a PLD of a human walker as central non-predictive cue. The saccade 
latencies were recorded coupled with ERPs target-locked responses to investigate the 
attention-related sensory gain effect to targets appearing at cued relative to uncued 
locations in a condition where the cue was represented by a human walking direction. 
Results of Experiment 7 demonstrated that 3-month-old infants did not show any 
behavioral effect, that means that infants were not faster to orient their attention in 
congruent rather than incongruent trials. Additionally, also ERP data did not reveal any 
modulation of P1 neural component related to congruency. The absence of any 
modulation of attention triggered by biological motion walking direction might be 
explained by to two possible interpretations. The first one might suggest that 3-months 
of age infants are not able to extract information of directionality from PLDs of a 
human walker whereas the second one is that infants might be able to extract the 
direction but they are not able to use this information as cue to orient attention. As 
demonstrated by Richards (2000) the absence of any effect also in the ERPs data might 
depend on the fact that at 3 months of age, the system is immature to show a modulation 
in sensory components related to an orienting of attention. Indeed, in the study done by 
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Richards (2000) only infants from 4.5 months of age showed a modulation of P1 
sensory components related to orienting of attention.  
In contrast, results of Experiment 8 demonstrated that 6-month-old infants can 
retrieve information of directionality from a PLD of human walker and they use this 
information to orient their attention towards the peripheral space. Six-month-old infants 
tested in Experiment 8, showed faster saccade latencies toward targets located in the 
congruent spatial position cued by walking direction rather than incongruent targets. 
These data confirm previous evidence that I found in a study that I conducted testing 6-
month-old infants using an eye-tracking technique (Bardi et al., 2015). However, results 
presented in my previous work recorded only overt responses and for this reason does 
not demonstrate that the human motion can trigger orienting of attention in the absence 
of eye movements. ERPs data of Experiment 8 support behavioral data, and 
demonstrate that the attentional effect occurs in the initial stages of visual processing. 
Specifically, target-locked ERP analysis demonstrated the existence of an attentional 
effect indexed by a greater P1 amplitude in response to congruent rather than 
incongruent trials. The modulation of P1 components suggest that the information 
provided by PLDs of a human walker can yield a gain control or selective amplification 
of the sensory information in the extra-cortical visual pathways. Moreover, event 
though, according to Rizzolatti and colleagues’ (1987) premotor theory of attention, the 
process of preparing the eyes to move is the mechanism by which endogenous spatial 
attention is engaged at target location before active stimulation, regardless of the nature, 
overt or covert, of the attentional shift, results of my previous work (Bardi et al., 2015) 
might be argued to be valid only for overt shifts of attention. Intriguing, the ERPs data 
found in Experiment 8 clearly demonstrate that biological motion can trigger an 
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orienting of attention even before the eye movements (i.e. covert orienting of attention), 
extending the results found in my previous work and suggesting that walking direction 
can trigger either overt orienting of attention (Bardi et al., 2015) and also covert 
orienting of attention in infancy.  
Experiment 9 replicate and extend previous findings obtained recording saccadic 
latencies showing that also in adults walking direction trigger a visuo-spatial orienting 
of attention (Bardi, et al., 2015). In the present version of the paradigm adults showed 
faster manual reaction times to detect targets that appeared in congruent rather than 
incongruent spatial position. More intriguingly ERPs data demonstrated that also in 
adults P1 sensory component is modulated by the cue-target congruency confirming that 
walking direction can yield a gain control or selective amplification of the sensory 
information in the extra-cortical visual pathways. 
Taken together, evidence described in Chapter 3 suggests that the ability to use 
walking direction to orient attention towards the peripheral space is an ability that 
emerges from 6 months of age.  
From a Neo/Neuro-constructivist perspective, the comparison between 3- and 6-
month-old infants suggests that the ability to use information, such as directionality, to 
orient attention is an ability that emerges gradually during the development. The system 
starts with pre-wired predispositions to detect motion cues that are present in social 
agents. These initial predispositions (Chapter 2) allow the system to focus attention 
towards specific cues of motion such as self-propulsion and Acceleration Deceleration 
pattern of motion, either when they are presented isolated or when they are presented 
embedded in complex PDL arrays. The sensitivity since birth to these complex patterns 
of dots reproducing the movement of a vertebrate animal independently form the global 
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shape configuration has already been documented. In Bardi and colleagues’ study 
(2014) newborns showed a spontaneous preference for a display representing the legs of 
a walking hen, compared with an identical display in which individual dots trajectories 
were inverted, suggesting that since birth the focus of newborns’ attention is tune 
towards the local dots that moves according to self-propulsion and AD pattern of 
motion. 
The series of experiments presented in my PhD thesis was aimed to further 
explore the functional relevance of these predisposition during development and the 
consequences in term of cost and benefits to focus attention on motion cues.  6-month-
old extract directionality and use it to orient attention towards the surrounding space 
whereas 3-month-olds infants do not utilize this cue. It might be plausible to 
hypothesized that, as well happened with other cues such as eye gaze (Farroni et al., 
2000), at 3 months of age a translational movement is required to orient infants’ 
attention. The PLDs stimuli employed in the experiments described in Chapter 3 were 
depicted a human that walks on the treadmill, so no perceiving translational movement 
was presented.  
  The Neuro-constructivist theoretical framework offers an interesting viewpoint 
for interpreting data presented in this thesis, and possibly guiding future research on the 
development of detection and recognition of social agents in human species. 
Results of the experiments presented in Chapter 2 demonstrate that since birth 
humans are sensitive to certain motion cues that characterize motion of animate entities. 
These early predispositions to attend to specific type of movements may help infants to 
understand the complexity of the world in which they are embedded since birth, 
selecting and constraining the relevant stimuli to which focus attention. Additionally, 
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previous work already demonstrated that newborns are sensitive to these cues of motion 
also when they are conveyed by complex arrays of dots that depicted walking figures 
(Simion et al., 2008; Bardi et al., 2011; 2014) or movements of body parts (Craighero, 
Lunghi, Leo, Ghirardi & Simion 2017). According to Frankenhuis and Barrett (2013), 
the detection and recognition of motion pattern when they are depicted as a human body 
or body parts might be facilitated by the action schemas that might be present in the 
infants’ motor repertoire. Specifically, my proposal is that the perception of an array of 
dots depicting a walking human body or a grasping hand activates or should activate an 
action schema present in the motor repertoire and this schema seems to have an 
attention orienting function. In light of this, infants should find behaviors that trigger an 
action schema as the most interesting to look at. Moreover, the attention orienting 
function of action schemas helps the infants to organize behavior into appropriate 
categories, which are critical for learning.   
 Frankenhuis and Barrett’s position is not in contrast with the hypothesis 
suggested by Troje and Westhoff (2006) and Johnson (2006) that states that humans 
possess a visual filter specific to motion of legged vertebrates. In my perspective, it is 
plausible to hypothesize that also the life detector is a mechanism supported by an 
action schema that is present in newborns’ repertoire. It is known that at birth newborns 
have an innate reflex of stepping suggesting that the motor schema of walking is already 
present at birth. Additionally, others action schemas, such as grasping seems to be 
present in the newborn’s motor repertoire. As demonstrated by Zoia and colleagues 
(2007), at 22 weeks of gestation fetuses are already able to adjust the acceleration of 
their own behavior (i.e. movement of the hand) in relation to the goal of the action 
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suggesting that even during prenatal life humans have experience of goal-directed 
actions.  
In light of this, it is plausible to hypothesize that at birth humans are endowed 
with both visual biases, such as attentional biases sensitive to cues of motion that 
characterize animate entities, and motor biases, such as action schemas that might be 
built based on the experience during the prenatal life and these schemas are activated 
when an action that is present in the motor repertoire is perceived. According to this 
hypothesis visual biases might be activated either when a single object is presented and 
it moves according to motion cues that define animate entities or when these cues of 
motion are presented in stimuli that follow the constraints of the body action schemas. 
Both visual biases and motor biases have an attention orienting function that constrain 
newborns and infants to focus attention to relevant stimuli (Frankenhuis & Barrett, 
2013) and so filtering the accessible experience.  
These biases, might be the bases on which infants identify conspecifics and are also the 
bases on which infants allocate attention towards the goal of an action (action priming; 
see figure 5.1). 
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Figure 5.1 Schematic representation of the model of development of detection of 
social agents hypothesized based on the data presented in the present thesis. 
 
According to Gredebäck and Daum (2015), once an agent is detected, observers 
adjust their attention in accordance with the direction of the other’s action. As 
demonstrated in literature, this attentional shift in the direction of others’ actions does 
not develop uniformly. The priming effect is strongest for action that infants can 
perform supporting the idea that action schemas play a central role in detection and 
recognition of others’ actions, since the first months of life. Specifically, a priming 
effect is present for static grasping hand at 5-7 months of life, (Daum & Gredebäck, 
2011) and appears around 12 months of age for an image of a pointing hand (Daum, 
Ulber, Gredebäck, 2013). Moreover, when hands are moving, priming effect emerge 
earlier, around 4 months (Rohlfing, Longo, & Bertenthal, 2012) and at 6 months of age, 
the priming effect is present only when the action is moving according to the constraints 
of the human body (Natale et al., 2016). As for the action of walking, data presented in 
this thesis, seem to suggest that when no translational movement occurs visuo-spatial 
orienting towards the position triggered by the walking direction emerges only at 6 
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months of age (Chapter 3, Bardi et al., 2015). These biases represent the basis on which 
humans develop the ability to orient attention towards the goal of an action (action 
priming) followed by the ability to anticipate the goal of an action (action prediction), 
and to evaluate others’ action by inferring intentions and disposition of other human 
being (action evaluation; Gredebäck & Daum, 2015; Figure 5.2). 
 
 
Figure 5.2 Schematic representation of the model depicted in the figure 5.1 and 
extended with the model of action understanding proposed by Gredebäck and 
Daum (2015).  
 
Taken together the collected evidence seems to support the Neuro-constructivist 
assumption that the system, at the beginning, is endowed with attentional biases toward 
visual cues of motion and actions and, during development, through the experience and 
general learning mechanisms such as associative learning, the system became 
specialized to detect social agents, to discriminate agent-action-goals, to predict 
consequences of action (action prediction) and later to infer what an agent is planning to 
do that means to read the internal states of an agent (action evaluation).  
This model of development, is in line with the embodied simulation theory 
(Gallese, 2014) which posits that an action is directly understood when the observer’s 
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motor system resonates in response to the observed action. Accordingly, it can be 
hypothesized that an innate rudimentary mirror neuron system (MNS) is already present 
at birth and can be flexibly modulated by motor experience and gradually enriched by 
visuomotor learning (Gallese, 2009). However, the evidence discussed in the present 
thesis does not directly proved the existence at birth of a functional mirror neuron 
system, but certainly supports the idea that humans are born with visual biases and 
motor biases that are the building blocks on which during the development and through 
mechanism of learning humans become specialized in detection, identification of 
conspecifics and later in reading their behavior.  
As suggested, preferential attention to motion cues and, more specifically, to 
biological motion cues has been interpreted as a precursor of the capacity to attribute 
intentions to others (Frith and Frith, 1999). This observation raises important issues 
concerning developmental disorders with core social perceptual deficits, such as autism 
(Thompson and Hardee, 2008). Thus, according to Neo/Neuro-constructivist approach 
atypical development can, like typical development, be characterized as an adaptation to 
multiple interacting constraints, with the only difference that the constraints are 
different.  
In light of this, to discover and to understand the constraints that shape typical 
development trajectory is an important step to investigate how different constraints 
shape atypical development. 
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